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EXPRESS PRECLUSION OF THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT FOR ALL
BANKRUPTCY-RELATED MATTERS
JOHN R. HARDISON†
INTRODUCTION
At least since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court of the
United States has taken a notably expansionist approach to the
scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), steadfastly refusing
to find exceptions to the enforceability of arbitration agreements.1
The Court has rejected arguments that the Federal Arbitration
Act’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements is inapplicable to
claims under the Sherman Act,2 the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act,3 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,4
the Securities Act of 1933,5 the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act,6 the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,7 the Credit Repair
†

Adjunct Professor, College of Law, Northern Illinois University; Career Law
Clerk to Hon. Thomas M. Lynch, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1
See, e.g., Imre S. Szalai, A New Legal Framework for Employee and Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 19 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 653, 660 (2018) (“Since the
1980s, the Supreme Court has radically transformed and expanded the FAA’s reach,
far beyond Congress’ original intent.”); Stephen A. Plass, Federal Arbitration Law and
the Preservation of Legal Remedies, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 213, 216 (2018); Jill I. Gross,
Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Understanding of
Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 124 (2015) (“Starting in the
1980s, the Court has held that courts must apply a presumption of arbitrability when
deciding such claims, the FAA applies to arbitration clauses in all agreements
‘involving commerce,’ and federal statutory claims are arbitrable as a matter of public
policy unless Congress explicitly says they are not.”); Paul F. Kirgis, Arbitration,
Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
503, 513 (2009); see also, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“It is only in the last few years that the Court has effectively rewritten
the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did not intend.”).
2
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
636 (1985).
3
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987).
4
Id. at 228–29.
5
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 477 (1989).
6
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991).
7
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534 (1995).
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Organizations Act,8 the Clayton Act,9 or the National Labor
Relations Act.10 Indeed, the only case in which the Supreme Court
had found an exception to the FAA for a federal statutory cause of
action—1953’s Wilko v. Swan11 decision—was overruled in 1989.12
Yet even in the face of this trend, every court of appeals13 to have
issued written opinions on the topic has found that federal courts
exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction have authority to refuse to
order arbitration or to stay a bankruptcy or bankruptcy-related
proceeding in favor of arbitration, at least with respect to certain
core bankruptcy issues.14

8

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 95 (2012).
See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
10
See generally Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
11
346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (invalidating agreement for arbitration to the extent
that it would have required arbitration of a claim under Section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989).
12
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (“We now conclude that Wilko was
incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of
other federal statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business
transactions.”).
13
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the applicability of the FAA
to bankruptcy-related matters. One of the parties to the contract in the Court’s
decision in the arbitration case Prima Paint Corporation had filed for protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, but neither party raised the issue, and the
Supreme Court did not address it. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395 (1967). It was the debtor-in-possession who sought to enforce the arbitration
clause, not a third party or a creditor. Id. at 398–99. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the debtor, Soler, filed a petition under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code after the district court ordered arbitration of its claims against
Mitsubishi. 473 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1985). The Supreme Court acknowledged that the
arbitration proceeding “came to a halt . . . upon the filing by Soler of [its] petition for
reorganization.” Id. at 623 n.12. But the effect of the bankruptcy stay was not an issue
before the Supreme Court because Soler had sought and obtained a modification of
the automatic stay permitting the appeal to go forward, asserting that “Supreme
Court review of the case would be in the ‘best interest’ of the debtor estate.” Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 814 F.2d 844, 845 (1st Cir. 1987).
14
See, e.g., Anderson v. Credit One Bank, N.A. (In re Anderson), 884 F.3d 382,
387, 392 (2d Cir. 2018); Kirkland v. Rund (In re EPD Inv. Co., L.L.C.), 821 F.3d 1146,
1150 (9th Cir. 2016); Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C., (In re White Mountain Mining Co.,
L.L.C.), 403 F.3d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 2005); Gandy v. Gandy (In re Gandy), 299 F.3d
489, 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2002).
9
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However, these courts have relied on policy reasons alone,15
finding no express textual support for the proposition that
the Bankruptcy Code overrides the FAA.16 This approach is
inconsistent with rulings by the Supreme Court showing disfavor
towards arguments of implied repeal17 or statutory interpretation
based solely on general notions of policy or equity.18 Many of these
court of appeals decisions also reference the “discretion” of the
bankruptcy courts to not enjoin core bankruptcy matters based on
conflict in policies,19 which is difficult to reconcile with the
Supreme Court’s statements that the FAA “leaves no place for the
exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that
district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on
issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.”20

15

See, e.g., U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (In re
U.S. Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 640 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that the FAA and the
Bankruptcy Code “present[] a conflict of near polar extremes: bankruptcy policy exerts
an inexorable pull towards centralization while arbitration policy advocates a
decentralized approach towards dispute resolution.” (citation omitted)).
16
See, e.g., Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Elec. Mach. Enters. (In re Elec.
Mach. Enters.), 479 F.3d 791, 796 (11th Cir. 2007) (“find[ing] no evidence within the
text or in the legislative history that Congress intended to create an exception to the
FAA in the Bankruptcy Code” and therefore looking to “whether an inherent conflict
exists between arbitration and the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code”).
17
There is a “ ‘stron[g] presum[ption]’ that repeals by implication are ‘disfavored’
and that ‘Congress will specifically address’ preexisting law when it wishes to suspend
its normal operations in a later statute.’ ” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612,
1624 (2018) (quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452–53 (1988), superseded
by statute, Civil Service Due Process Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat.
461 (1990)).
18
See, e.g., Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1632 (criticizing dissent for “retreat[ing] to
policy arguments” and concluding that the “policy may be debatable but the law is
clear: Congress has instructed that arbitration agreements like those before us must
be enforced as written”).
19
See, e.g., Anderson v. Credit One Bank, N.A. (In re Anderson), 884 F.3d 382,
387 (2d Cir. 2018) (“If the bankruptcy court determines that arbitration would create
a ‘severe conflict’ with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, it has discretion to
conclude that ‘Congress intended to override the Arbitration Act’s general policy
favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements.’ ” (quoting MBNA Am. Bank,
N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2006))).
20
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985); see also Note,
Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy Proceedings: A Test Case for Implied Repeal of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2304 (2004) (“There is no basis for the
substantial discretion placed in courts by the current methodology. The FAA creates
a mandatory binary framework: If a valid arbitration clause exists, arbitration must
be ordered. If the FAA has been explicitly or impliedly repealed with respect to the
type of claim raised, then arbitration cannot be ordered.”).
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There is no need, however, for the courts to rely on general
notions of policy, equitable considerations, or supposed equitable
powers to find an exception to the FAA for bankruptcy-related
matters. Congress has expressly authorized federal courts to hear
all matters related to a bankruptcy case notwithstanding the FAA
or any contractual agreement to arbitrate. Specifically, in the
1978 bankruptcy amendments—carried through in the current
text under the 1984 amendments—Congress broadly granted
original jurisdiction to the district courts, and by delegation the
bankruptcy courts, over “all civil proceedings arising under title
11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.”21
While the Supreme Court has been hostile to implied repeal
or preclusion of claims under one federal statute by another, the
bankruptcy jurisdictional statute contains express language of
preclusion, stating that the grant of jurisdiction shall be effective
“notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive
jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts.”22
Under this statutory authority, district courts exercising
bankruptcy jurisdiction, and by delegation, bankruptcy courts,
have express authority to hear all matters related to bankruptcy
cases notwithstanding any arbitration agreement to the contrary.
In addition to the tenuous foundation of the lower courts’
policy-based approach, the approach is also in conflict with the
bankruptcy statute in substance. First, the current approach is
too narrow, giving no authority to bankruptcy courts to refuse to
order arbitration of “non-core” matters even if related to a
bankruptcy case and indeed not permitting bankruptcy courts to
hear certain “core” bankruptcy matters. Second, the current
approach places the burden upon the party opposing arbitration to
demonstrate that a rare exception to the FAA is warranted.
Instead, the jurisdictional grant gives original jurisdiction to
federal courts to hear all matters related to bankruptcy cases,
regardless of whether core or non-core. While a bankruptcy court
may have authority to permit arbitration of such matters under

21
22

28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2018).
Id.
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the doctrine of abstention,23 or pursuant to statute24 or rule,25 the
burden is on the party requesting arbitration to demonstrate that
arbitration will not impede the rights of any party with an interest
in the bankruptcy case. Importantly, that determination requires
consideration of not only the rights of the counterparties to the
arbitration agreement, but of all creditors and other parties with
an interest in the bankruptcy estate. Because of the permanent
and far-reaching effect of the bankruptcy proceeding—whether by
statutory discharge or by the terms of a confirmed plan of
reorganization26—the bankruptcy proceeding is generally the last
and only opportunity for creditors to assert their claims and to
share in the limited remaining assets of a bankruptcy debtor.27
Through the structure of the Bankruptcy Code and related
jurisdictional provisions, Congress has ensured that creditors will
have notice and the opportunity to participate in matters affecting
23
See infra Part V; see also Patrick M. Birney, Reawakening Section 1334:
Resolving the Conflict Between Bankruptcy and Arbitration Through an Abstention
Analysis, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 619, 622–23 (2008) (suggesting that rather than
viewing the FAA as restricting the ability of bankruptcy courts to hear matters unless
arbitration is shown to inherently conflict with bankruptcy purposes, a “[more]
appropriate analytical framework” to reconcile the two statutes is to see the grant of
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court as absolute unless permissive abstention is
warranted under the authority to abstain expressly granted in the bankruptcy
jurisdictional provisions).
24
See 28 U.S.C. § 654 (2018) (authorizing, with certain exceptions, district courts
to “allow the referral to arbitration of any civil action (including any adversary
proceeding in bankruptcy) pending before it when the parties consent”).
25
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(c) (“On stipulation of the parties to any controversy
affecting the estate the court may authorize the matter to be submitted to final and
binding arbitration.”).
26
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2018) (noting that discharge “operates as an
injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment
of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any [discharged] debt as a personal
liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived”); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1123(b)(5), 1222(b)(2), 1322(b)(2) (2018). With certain exceptions, a bankruptcy
plan of reorganization may “modify the rights of holders of secured claims . . . or of
holders of unsecured claims.” § 1123(b)(5).
27

[D]ue to the impact on other creditors, consent should not be imputed even
in debtor-derived claims. After all, a creditor who never signed an arbitration
agreement may still have his recovery determined by arbitration, if another
creditor has signed such an agreement and is allowed to enforce arbitration
of his claims. Because the insolvent estate is finite and distributed pro rata
to creditors, the arbitrator’s valuation of one creditor’s claim affects the
recovery of other creditors as well. This effect is magnified if the arbitrated
claim is entitled to priority and full payment before any payments are made
on general claims.
Marianne B. Culhane, Limiting Litigation over Arbitration in Bankruptcy, 17 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 493, 497 (2009).
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the estate before their contract and property rights against the
debtor are terminated.28 If an arbitration agreement is enforced,
and the creditors were not parties to the agreement, the creditors’
due process rights may be jeopardized.29
The courts of appeals so far have either not considered the
importance of the bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions to the issue
or have not fully recognized the nature of and reasons Congress
had for creating such jurisdictional structure. In particular, they
have overemphasized the 1984 amendments and the “core”-“noncore” distinction contained within those amendments, which goes
to the allocation of authority between district courts and
bankruptcy courts, and not to the overall grant of bankruptcy
jurisdiction to the federal courts.
They have also drawn
unwarranted conclusions from the Supreme Court’s decisions on
the interaction between the FAA and other federal statutes, none
of which had language like the bankruptcy provisions. Finally,
they have too narrowly described bankruptcy policies and thus too
narrowly described the scope of the bankruptcy exception to the
FAA. In particular, the courts of appeals have focused on notions
of judicial economy rather than on the rights of other creditors and

28
See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 2018(a) (“In a case under the Code, after hearing on
such notice as the court directs and for cause shown, the court may permit any
interested entity to intervene generally or with respect to any specified matter.”);
11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2018) (“A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a
creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity
security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on
any issue in a case under this chapter.”); 11 U.S.C. § 307 (2018) (“The United States
trustee may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in any case or proceeding
under this title . . . .”).
29
See, e.g., Culhane, supra note 27, at 496 (“Bankruptcy is quintessentially a
collective proceeding with centralized control of the property of the estate and
creditors’ claims . . . [and the] inescapable impact of arbitration on third parties who
have not consented is a cause for concern, given the collective nature of bankruptcy
process.”); Note, supra note 20, at 2309 (“[A]lthough the FAA requires consent to be
bound by an arbitration award, the Code has modified this background law by creating
a system that will bind creditors through determinations of others’ rights regardless
of nonparty status; this modification suggests the need to depart from a formalistically
narrow definition of whose consent is required for arbitration.”). The Supreme Court
has disfavored class arbitration as “rais[ing] serious due process concerns by
adjudicating the rights of absent members of the plaintiff class . . . with only limited
judicial review.” Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019). Depriving
bankruptcy creditors of their right to participate in matters affecting the estate raises
even more serious due process concerns, as those creditors did not consent to any form
of arbitration.
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parties whose interests might be affected by the bankruptcy to
notice and to the opportunity to participate in matters affecting
the bankruptcy estate.
This Article sets forth a more solid justification for bankruptcy
courts to refuse to order arbitration of any matter related to and
affecting a bankruptcy case through express preclusion. First, this
Article describes the historical development of the Supreme
Court’s holdings on preclusion of the FAA in general and on the
courts of appeals’ current formulation of a bankruptcy exception
to the FAA. Next, this Article discusses the statutory, historical,
and policy-based support for reading the bankruptcy jurisdictional
provisions as creating an express exception to the FAA, or
alternatively as supporting an implied exception to the FAA. As
discussed, even if based on policy, the exception should extend to
all matters relating to bankruptcy cases, and any presumption
should be in favor of bankruptcy adjudication, not arbitration.
Finally, this Article discusses the place of arbitration even within
such framework.
I.
A.

HISTORY OF THE FAA AND BANKRUPTCY

The Supreme Court on Preclusion of the FAA

Through the FAA, enacted in 1925,30 “Congress has instructed
federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to
their terms.”31 “Section 2[,] the FAA’s substantive mandate,”32
states that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.33

30
Act of Feb. 12, 1925, 43 Stat. 883 recodified as Title 9 of the United States Code
by Act of July 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 674; see 31 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL
§ 904.2 (3d ed. 2019).
31
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
32
Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 629 (2009).
33
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
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Consistent with this provision, the Supreme Court has held that
“courts must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements according
to their terms.”34 While the text of the statute only refers to a
“controversy [] arising out of” a “contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce,” the Supreme Court has broadly held that the
mandate “holds true for claims that allege a violation of a federal
statute, unless the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a
contrary congressional command.’ ”35 Other portions of the Act
provide for enforcement of this mandate, requiring federal courts
to stay proceedings pending before them regarding issues covered
by an arbitration agreement upon request,36 providing authority
for a federal district court to compel arbitration of such matters if
the court would have had jurisdiction “save for such agreement,”37
and requiring federal courts to enter orders confirming an
arbitration award upon application.38
34
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) (quoting Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
35
Id. at 232–33 (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98
(2012)).
36

If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for
such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default
in proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (2018).
37

A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition [a federal
district court which would have had jurisdiction save for such agreement] for
an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for
in such agreement.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2018).
38

If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court
shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall
specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made
any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order
confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order
unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections
10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties,
then such application may be made to the United States court in and for the
district within which such award was made.
9 U.S.C. § 9 (2018). Under Section 10, an arbitration award may only be vacated
“where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means,” the arbitrators
were guilty of prejudicial misconduct or evidenced partiality or corruption, or exceeded
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However, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that
while “a court’s authority under the Arbitration Act to compel
arbitration may be considerable, it isn’t unconditional.”39 The Act
“applies only when the parties’ agreement to arbitrate is set forth
as a ‘written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce’ ” and only if the
agreement is within the scope of the Act.40 Although speedy
determination and lower litigation costs are often espoused as
benefits of arbitration over litigation, and Congress was not “blind
to the potential benefit” of enforcing arbitration, the Supreme
Court has “reject[ed] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the
Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution
of claims.”41 Instead, the Court has held that “the Act was
motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce
agreements into which parties had entered” and thereby “overrule
the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to
arbitrate.”42
Rather than “create[] . . . new legislation [or]
grant[] . . . new rights,”43 the FAA was intended only to create “a
remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in
admiralty contracts” and thereby “place an arbitration agreement
‘upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.’ ”44

their powers or grossly and imperfectly executed such powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018).
Section 11 limits the grounds upon which a district court can modify or correct an
award. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2018).
39
New Prime, Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 537 (2019).
40
Id.
41
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985).
42
Id. at 219–20 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)). Because
of “the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce
specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were thereby ousted
from their jurisdiction.” Id. at 220 n.6 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1-2 (1924)). Such principle had become “firmly embedded in the English common law
and was adopted with it by the American courts” prior to the enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act. Id.
43
Id. at 220 n.7 (quoting 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924)).
44
Id. at 220 n.7, 219 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96–68, at 1 (1924)). The Court has
highlighted that “a ‘rule[] of fundamental importance’ under the FAA [is] that
arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion.’ ” Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S.
Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S.
662, 681 (2010)).
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As a federal statute, the FAA is subject to repeal or preclusion
by another subsequent statute enacted by Congress.45 While it
might be easy to draw the conclusion from the Supreme Court’s
recent track record that the Court is unlikely to find that another
federal statute supersedes the FAA, it is important to highlight
what the Supreme Court has held and what it has not held. First,
the Supreme Court has never actually adjudicated a case where it
was claimed that another federal statute expressly repealed or
precluded the FAA. In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Supreme
Court, in dicta, highlighted four recent statutes through which
Congress demonstrated “that it knows how to override the
Arbitration Act when it wishes.”46 However, Epic Systems

45

See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 873 (1996) (explaining
that the Court has long recognized that, with certain exceptions, “ ‘a general
law . . . may be repealed, amended or disregarded by the legislature which enacted it,’
and ‘is not binding upon any subsequent legislature.’ ” (quoting Manigault v. Springs,
199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905))); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932) (“[T]he
will of a particular Congress . . . does not impose itself upon those to follow in
succeeding years.”); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26
(1991) (“Although all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, ‘[h]aving
made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights
at issue.’ ” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985))).
46
138 S. Ct. 1612, 1626 (2018). These included:
(i) a 2002 statutory provision that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision
of law, whenever a motor vehicle franchise contract provides for the use
of arbitration to resolve a controversy arising out of or relating to such
contract, arbitration may be used to settle such controversy only if after
such controversy arises all parties to such controversy consent in
writing to use arbitration to settle such controversy.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)(2) (2018);
(ii) provisions added by the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act to a commodity
whistleblower protection statute providing that (1) “[t]he rights and
remedies provided for in this section may not be waived by any
agreement, policy form, or condition of employment including by a
predispute arbitration agreement” and (2) “[n]o predispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires
arbitration of a dispute arising under this section,” 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(1)–
(2) (2018);
(iii) a 2010 provision in the statute establishing and governing the Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection, providing for employee protection of
employees of entities regulated by the Bureau from retaliation for
cooperation with the Bureau and providing with certain exceptions
(1) “notwithstanding any other provision of law, the rights and remedies
provided for in this section may not be waived by any agreement, policy,
form, or condition of employment, including by any predispute
arbitration agreement” and (2) “notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable
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involved only an argument of implied repeal.47 Similarly, in
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, another case involving only
implied repeal, the Court cited some of the same recent statutes
as support for its conclusion that had Congress meant to prohibit
arbitration agreements in contracts subject to the Credit Repair
Organizations Act, “it would have done so in a manner less obtuse
than what respondents suggest.”48 Of course, not stated in Epic
Systems or CompuCredit is that Congress equally knows how to
make clear that it intends a statute not to override the FAA.49 Nor
should Congress’s recent use of specific language imply that its use
of more general language years before did not express intent to
supersede the FAA. As noted in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Epic
Systems, the statutes cited by the majority “are of recent vintage”
and “each was enacted during the time this Court’s decisions
increasingly alerted Congress that it would be wise to leave not
the slightest room for doubt if it wants to secure access to a judicial
forum or to provide a green light for group litigation before an
arbitrator or court.”50 The fact that Congress has been more
to the extent that it requires arbitration of a dispute arising under this
section,” 12 U.S.C. § 5567(d)(1)–(2) (2018); and
(iv) a 2006 statute governing terms of consumer credit extended to members
of the armed forces and dependents providing that
[n]otwithstanding section 2 of title 9, or any other Federal or State
law, rule, or regulation, no agreement to arbitrate any dispute
involving the extension of consumer credit shall be enforceable
against any covered member or dependent of such a member, or any
person who was a covered member or dependent of that member
when the agreement was made.
10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2018); see also David L. Noll, Arbitration Conflicts, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 665, 686, 740 App. A (2018) (listing federal legislation since 2007 addressing
arbitration).
47
138 S. Ct. at 1624.
48
565 U.S. 95, 103–04 (2012) (first citing 7 U.S.C. § 26; then citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)(2); and then citing 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b)). The Court noted 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b)
does not itself limit arbitration, but rather grants express “authority to the newly
created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to regulate predispute arbitration
agreements in contracts for consumer financial products or services.” Id.
49
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 651(e) (2018) (“This chapter shall not affect title 9, United
States Code.”).
50
138 S. Ct. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In contrast to the bankruptcy
statute or the National Labor Relations Act at issue in Epic Systems, the statute at
issue in CompuCredit was enacted well after the Supreme Court’s recent trend
towards expansion of the FAA began. Indeed, the Court in CompuCredit emphasized
that “[a]t the time of the CROA’s enactment in 1996, arbitration clauses in contracts
of the type at issue here were no rarity [as] the early 1990s saw the increased use of
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts generally, and in financial services
contracts in particular.” 565 U.S. at 103; see also, e.g., Noll, supra note 46, at 712 (“The
more fundamental problem with the argument is that it places a burden on Congress
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specific in several recent statutes does little, therefore, to show its
intent in 1978 or 1984 when the bankruptcy jurisdictional
provisions were enacted and modified, as “later enacted
laws . . . do not declare the meaning of earlier law.”51
Second, in virtually all of the cases in which the Supreme
Court addressed an argument that a claim under another federal
statute should be excepted from the effect of the FAA, the
argument was that enforcement of the substantive claim itself
served an important societal purpose that could be jeopardized if
left to arbitration. In most of these cases, the plaintiff had not
pointed to any statutory text supporting the argument. For
example, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., the court of appeals had found “the pervasive public interest
in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the claims
that arise in such cases, combine to make . . . antitrust
claims . . . inappropriate for arbitration” despite “the absence of
any explicit support for such an exception in either the Sherman
Act or the Federal Arbitration Act.”52 The Supreme Court
reversed, rejecting policy-based arguments—at least in the
context of international transactions53—that antitrust actions
were too complex for arbitration, that contracts involving antitrust
issues have an inordinate danger of being contracts of adhesion,
that potential arbitrators are likely to be “innate[ly] hostil[e]” to
antitrust law, or that the national interest in enforcing antitrust
laws demonstrated by the “crucial deterrent” of the statute’s
treble-damages provision could not be achieved outside an
American court.54 Instead, the Court found “no reason to assume
at the outset of the dispute that international arbitration will not
provide an adequate mechanism” and that “so long as the
that makes no sense when the development of federal arbitration law is viewed in
historical context.”).
51
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237 (1998).
52
473 U.S. 614, 628–29 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Am.
Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827–28 (1968)).
53

[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need
of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of
disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that
a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.
Id. at 629. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court later
applied the FAA to antitrust claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts that
apparently involved no international transactions or foreign arbitration with no
discussion of the issue. 570 U.S. 228, 231–32 (2013).
54
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632–35.
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prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum,55 the statute will continue to serve
both its remedial and deterrent function.”56 The Court also noted
that the legislative choice to provide for enforcement through a
private right of action rather than a direct regulatory structure
already risked lack of enforcement by placing the antitrust cause
of action “at all times under the control of the individual litigant:
no citizen is under an obligation to bring an antitrust suit, and the
private antitrust plaintiff needs no executive or judicial approval
before settling one.”57 Similarly, the Court held that the general
deterrent function of providing a private cause of action for claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
did not justify a court-created implied or policy-based exception to
the FAA.58 Deterrence can be achieved through direct government
55
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court referred to this
“effective vindication” exception as dicta, noting that while several later cases
mentioned the phrase, none found it to apply. 570 U.S. at 235 (first citing 14 Penn
Plaza L.L.C. v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273–74 (2009); and then citing Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). Similarly, the Court in Italian
Colors found that the mere possibility of increased litigation costs caused by a waiver
of the right to class arbitration did not preclude a litigant from effectively vindicating
the rights provided under the antitrust laws, particularly given the fact that federal
law did not adopt the class action for legal relief until 1938. 570 U.S. at 236 (noting
that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy
does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy”).
56
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636–37; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (“[B]y agreeing
to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum.”) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
57
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636 (citation omitted). In contrast, at least where a
bankruptcy-related matter is brought by a trustee or debtor-in-possession on behalf of
a bankruptcy estate, approval of the bankruptcy court is required with prior notice to
creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and other parties in interest. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 9019(a). Notice is also required for a trustee to abandon—and therefore
choose not to pursue—a claim of the estate against third parties. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a)
(2018) (“After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the
estate.” (emphasis added)); FED. R. BANKR. P. 6007(a) (notice of proposed
abandonment or disposition). Although Section 554(c) provides for automatic
abandonment of scheduled but unadministered assets upon closure of the case,
creditors and other parties in interest have the opportunity to object to a trustee’s
final report prior to closure of the case. FED. R. BANKR. P. 5009(a).
58
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987) (noting
“nothing in the text of the RICO statute that even arguably evinces congressional
intent to exclude civil RICO claims from the dictates of the Arbitration Act” and “no
hint in these legislative debates that Congress intended for RICO treble-damages
claims to be excluded from the ambit of the Arbitration Act”); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
26–27 (noting petitioner conceded that nothing in text or legislative history of ADEA
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action without need to judicially create an exception to the FAA.
For example, as the Court held in E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc.,
an arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee
does not bind the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
and the “proarbitration policy goals of the FAA do not require the
agency to relinquish its statutory authority [to bring an
enforcement action under the Americans with Disabilities Act or
the Civil Rights Act of 1991] if it has not agreed to do so.”59
The Supreme Court has also rejected arguments that vague
and general statutory language protecting rights given under a
federal statute demonstrate intent to override the FAA. For
example, in Epic Systems, the Court found that the National Labor
Relations Act’s guarantee of workers’ right “to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection” did not make an arbitration
agreement that barred class arbitration “illegal” or conflict with
the FAA.60 Similarly, the Court has rejected arguments that a
statutory provision that broadly and generally invalidates waivers
of rights under a federal statute demonstrates legislative intent to
displace the FAA, even if the statute elsewhere provides a private
right of action. In CompuCredit, the Court found that a statutory
provision requiring credit repair organizations to provide
consumers with disclosures, including a statement that they “have
a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the Credit
Repair Organization Act,” together with a provision of the Act
voiding and making unenforceable “[a]ny waiver by any consumer
of any protection provided by or any right of the consumer under”
the Credit Repair Organization Act did not reflect congressional
intent to preclude the FAA.61 As explained by the Court, the

explicitly precludes arbitration and the Court found no inherent conflict); see also 14
Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. 247, 258 (holding that the ADEA is no different in the context of
a collective bargaining agreement).
59
534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002).
60
138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018); see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V
Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534 (1995) (interpreting provision of Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act invalidating contract provisions “lessening such liability otherwise than as
provided in” the statute as not invalidating an arbitration agreement requiring
arbitration in a foreign jurisdiction, on the theory that the cost of international
arbitration would lessen a plaintiff’s recovery, and therefore avoiding potential
conflict with FAA).
61
565 U.S. 95, 99 (2012).
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disclosure provision only created “the right to receive the
statement,” not a specific right to bring an action in a judicial court
of law.62
Similarly, the Court has found general antiwaiver provisions
in the securities laws not to preclude the FAA. Although the Court
had held in Wilko that a provision of the Securities Act of 1933
declaring “void” any “condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any
provision of the Securities Act invalidated an agreement for
arbitration of issues arising under the Securities Act,”63 the Court
distinguished and later overruled that holding.
First, in
64
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Court, in
interpreting similar anti-waiver language in the Exchange Act of
1934,65 held that the section invalidating any agreement “to waive
compliance with any provision of [the Act]” did not apply to the
section providing federal courts with jurisdiction over violations
because the jurisdiction provision “itself does not impose any duty
with which persons trading in securities must ‘comply.’ ”66 Two
years later, the Supreme Court resolved the tension between the
holdings in Wilko and McMahon with respect to the similar
statutory provisions by finding that Wilko was wrongly decided
and was clouded by the “old judicial hostility to arbitration” that
the FAA was intended to end.67 The Court in Rodriguez de Quilas
found that, as with the similar language in the Exchange Act
of 1934, there was “no sound basis for construing the
62

Id.
346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953). The Court had also expressed concern that the
Securities Act was intended to protect investors in securities, who often have an
unequal bargaining position and unequal information, and to prevent fraud. Id.
at 430–31.
64
482 U.S. 220, 220–21 (1987).
65
The Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. had previously suggested a “colorable
argument” that the two provisions were distinguishable because, for example, the
Securities Act of 1933 provided an express “special right” of a private remedy for civil
liability while there was no statutory counterpart in the Exchange Act of 1934, for
which only an implied private cause of action was established through case law.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513, 513–14 (1974). But the Court
ultimately determined that the arbitration clause at issue was enforceable with
respect to Exchange Act claims because of the international nature of the transaction
and concerns for international comity. Id. at 515–16, 520 n.15 (relying also in part on
the United States’s 1970 accession to the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards).
66
Shearson/Am, Express Inc., 482 U.S. at 227–28. The Court also noted that “the
SEC has sufficient statutory authority to ensure that arbitration is adequate to
vindicate Exchange Act rights.” Id. at 238.
67
Rodriguez de Quilas v. Shearson/Am. Express. Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989).
63
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prohibition . . . on waiving ‘compliance with any provision’ of the
Securities Act [of 1933] to apply to . . . procedural provisions” such
as the jurisdictional provision of the Act.68
In contrast, Congress’s choice to place all matters with an
impact on a bankruptcy case within the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts is primarily of procedural, not substantive,
importance. It enables the bankruptcy court, the trustees
appointed to administer the case, the debtor, and all creditors or
other parties with an interest in the bankruptcy estate to monitor
the progress of a matter affecting the estate and provides the
opportunity to assert their respective rights or objections. It also
places the matter before an adjudicator who can recognize the
impact of the proceeding on the rights of parties to the bankruptcy
case and can ensure those rights are respected. Finally, it
promotes orderly and efficient administration of the bankruptcy
case and estate, permitting the trustee and other parties to assert
their interests in the same court and pursuant to the same rules
of procedure, with centralized notice to all affected parties.
Therefore, the decision to place the matters before the bankruptcy
court is not simply a matter of distrust of arbitration as a method
of enforcing parties’ substantive rights. Indeed, Congress chose to
place such matters before the bankruptcy courts not only in favor
of arbitration, but also in favor of all other judicial courts, state
or federal.69
Finally, it is important to note that while the Court mentioned
jurisdiction in Scherk, McMahon, and Rodriguez de Quilas, the
jurisdictional provisions of the securities laws were not themselves
at issue in those cases. Instead, in all three cases the only
arguments raised were that the statutory provision voiding
contractual waiver of rights under the securities statute should be
read to include waiver of the right to have an action adjudicated
by a judicial court or that the general purposes of the securities
acts and the FAA were at odds. No party raised a specific
argument that the jurisdictional provisions of either the Securities
Act or the Exchange Act themselves demonstrated congressional
intent to repeal the FAA. The Court, therefore, has only at most
suggested, but never actually ruled, that a statutory grant of
jurisdiction by itself is insufficient to override the FAA and
preclude arbitration. In McMahon, which held that the Exchange

68
69

Id. at 482.
11 U.S.C. § 105 (2018).
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Act of 1934 did not override the enforceability of arbitration
provisions under the FAA, the Court mentioned that the Exchange
Act of 1934 provides that district courts “shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of this title . . . and of all suits in equity
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created
by this title” but did not discuss the direct relationship of this
provision to the FAA—an argument apparently not raised by the
respondents.70 The Court has also briefly mentioned the exclusive
jurisdiction provision of the Exchange Act in several other FAA
cases in order to distinguish it from the Securities Act, which does
not provide for exclusive jurisdiction—particularly while Wilko
remained good law for the proposition that the FAA conflicted with
the Securities Act. For example, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
in the midst of a discussion of a “colorable argument” that the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act are distinguishable because
one provides an express private cause of action while in the other
the right is only implied, the Court referenced the exclusive
jurisdiction provision as additional support for its holding that the
Exchange Act did not supersede the FAA.71 While one would
normally think of exclusive jurisdiction as being less consistent
with arbitration, not more, the Court reasoned this way because
the issue was waiver, not jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that
because exclusive jurisdiction limits the number of potential
judicial forums a plaintiff can choose, the deprivation of court
access is somehow less of a hardship than if more forums were
available.72 The Court did not rule on this ground, however, and
instead distinguished the facts in Wilko and found that
enforcement of the arbitration agreement at issue did not conflict
with the Exchange Act because an international transaction was
involved.73 The Court revisited the distinction between the
Exchange and Securities Acts in Rodriguez de Quijas, noting as
70

482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
417 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1974).
72
Id. at 514 (“The analogous provision of the 1934 Act, by contrast, provides for
suit only in the federal district courts that have ‘exclusive jurisdiction,’ thus
significantly restricting the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” (citation omitted)).
73
Id. at 519 (holding that invalidation of the international arbitration agreement
would reflect a “parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws
and in our courts [and] [w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and
international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in
our courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The petitioner had also argued that
Wilko was distinguishable because Wilko involved parties “exhibit[ing] a disparity of
bargaining power.” Id. at 512 n.6. Ruling on other grounds, however, the Court found
no need to consider that contention. Id.
71

644

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:627

additional grounds for overruling Wilko that the antiwaiver
provision of the Securities Act was “in every respect the same as
that” in the Exchange Act found not to conflict with the FAA in
McMahon.74 Reasoning that the “only conceivable distinction in
this regard” was that the Exchange Act provided for exclusive
federal jurisdiction while the Securities Act did not, the Court
found the concurrent jurisdiction provided by the Securities Act
was more reason, not less, to overrule Wilko.75 The Court did not,
however, revisit the unasked question of whether the exclusive
jurisdiction provision of the Exchange Act should have been reason
enough to override the FAA.
B. Application of the McMahon Test by the Courts of Appeals
In McMahon, the Supreme Court stated that the “burden is
on the party opposing arbitration . . . to show that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory
rights at issue” and “[i]f Congress did intend to limit or prohibit
waiver76 of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent
will be deducible from [the statute’s] text or legislative history, or
from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s
underlying purposes.”77 The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth
74

490 U.S. 477, 482 (1989).
Id. at 482–83.
76
None of the courts of appeals to apply this language from McMahon to
bankruptcy-related matters discuss why limitations on “waiver” of rights is applicable
to bankruptcy matters. Waiver was relevant to the Exchange Act at issue in McMahon
because the statute contained a provision declaring void “[a]ny condition, stipulation,
or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of [the Act].”
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Exchange Act “was intended
principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices,” and the
anti-waiver provision helped ensure that protection was not easily given away. Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). In contrast, the courts of appeals do
not rely upon or point to language in the Bankruptcy Code invalidating waivers of the
right to proceed in a bankruptcy court. Additionally, while one purpose of bankruptcy
laws is to protect debtors by providing a “fresh start,” an at least equally important
purpose is to ensure a fair and equitable distribution to creditors. See, e.g., Kirgis,
supra note 1, at 505; Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (explaining that
bankruptcy power to avoid certain prepetition preferential transfers facilitates “the
prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor.”).
The concerns about arbitrating bankruptcy-related matters go beyond mere protection
of debtors from the effect of agreements they entered into prepetition. Because the
concerns and parties affected are broader, it is therefore not clear that the test set
forth in McMahon is the correct one for bankruptcy-related matters.
77
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Fifth Circuit recently rejected an argument that language in the Supreme Court’s
2018 Epic Systems opinion overruled or abrogated the McMahon test. Henry v. Educ.
75

2019]

EXPRESS PRECLUSION OF THE FAA

645

and Eleventh Circuits—the only circuit courts with written
opinions on the issue of the intersection of bankruptcy law
and the FAA subsequent to McMahon—have all relied on
the third “inherent conflict” prong of this so-called “McMahon
test”78 to find or suggest that the FAA does not require
enforcement of arbitration agreements in the context of certain
bankruptcy-related matters.79 Several of the courts of appeals
have summarily concluded that there is nothing in the language
of the bankruptcy statutes or their legislative history to show
express congressional intent to override the FAA, though with
little or no discussion of any actual statutory text or history.80
Fin. Serv. (In re Henry), 944 F.3d 587, 592 (5th Cir. 2019). The creditor relied on
language in Epic Systems stating that a party “seeking to suggest that two statutes
cannot be harmonized, and that one displaces the other, bears the heavy burden of
showing a clearly expressed congressional intention that such a result should follow.”
Id. at 590 (quoting 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018)). The Fifth Circuit disagreed that the
cases were in conflict, noting that while “the Supreme Court’s decision in Epic Systems
has a different tone, the test it employs is substantially the same as McMahon’s.”
Id. at 592.
78
But see Kirgis, supra note 1, at 517, 523–24 (suggesting reliance on McMahon
“rests on a flawed foundation,” both because McMahon expanded, not contracted, the
scope of arbitration and because the issue in McMahon was preclusion of a “ ‘claim
founded on statutory rights.’ ” (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226)).
79
See, e.g., In re EPD Inv. Co., L.L.C., 821 F.3d 1146, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2016);
Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 438 (2nd Cir. 1977); Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1156–57 (3d Cir. 1989); Moses v.
CashCall, Inc., 781 F.3d 63, 71, 72, 73 (4th Cir. 2015); Matter of Nat’l Gypsum Co.,
118 F.3d 1056, 1058 (5th Cir. 1997); Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Elec. Mach.
Enters., Inc. (In re Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc.), 479 F.3d 791, 795–96, 798–99 (11th Cir.
2007). Additionally, courts both before the 1978 amendments and after have looked to
whether a bankruptcy estate or trustee is even bound by an arbitration agreement
signed prepetition by a debtor—generally finding that such an agreement does not
apply to or bind the estate with respect to creditor-derived claims, such as fraudulent
transfer or preference claims. See, e.g., In re EPD Inv. Co., L.L.C., 821 F.3d at 1152
(“For the purpose of these claims, the Trustee stands in the shoes of the creditors, not
the debtors. Only the parties to an arbitration agreement are bound by it.”); Allegaert,
548 F.2d at 436 (“Since the trustee stands in the creditor’s shoes for [the purpose of
Bankruptcy avoidance actions], he too should not be compelled to arbitrate these
claims.”). On the other hand, where either a debtor seeks relief on his or her own
individual behalf or where the trustee is pursuing an action inherited from the debtor
and for which the trustee “stands in the shoes of the debtor,” the courts have found
the arbitration agreement to be binding unless otherwise overridden by the
Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Hays & Co., 885 F.2d at 1154 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (In actions brought by the trustee as successor to the debtor’s interest under
section 541 the “ ‘trustee stands in the shoes of the debtor and’ . . . is bound to
arbitrate all of its claims that are derived from the rights of the debtor under
section 541.”).
80
See, e.g., Hays & Co., 885 F.2d at 1157 (“Hays has pointed to no provisions in
the text of the bankruptcy laws, and we know of none, suggesting that arbitration
clauses are unenforceable in a non-core adversary proceeding . . . .”); In re Elec. Mach.
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Others simply jumped to the “inherent conflict” prong of the
McMahon test, finding it unnecessary to look to the statute or
legislative history or not addressing the statutory text because the
argument was not raised.81 While several of these cases found
under the circumstances that the bankruptcy court was required
to stay the bankruptcy-related matter at issue and order
arbitration,82 others held that the court had “discretion” to refuse
to order arbitration.83 The courts of appeals have expressed mild
Enters., Inc., 479 F.3d at 796 (“[W]e find no evidence within the text or in the
legislative history that Congress intended to create an exception to the FAA in the
Bankruptcy Code [and] [t]herefore look to the third factor of the McMahon test . . . .”)
(citation omitted); Ackerman v. Eber (In re Eber), 687 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“This Circuit and sister circuits applying the McMahon factors to the Bankruptcy
Code have found no evidence in the text of the Bankruptcy Code or in the legislative
history suggesting that Congress intended to create an exception to the FAA in the
Bankruptcy Code.”).
81
The Fourth Circuit, in Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain
Mining Co., L.L.C.), noted a possible “argument . . . that the statutory text giving
bankruptcy courts core-issue jurisdiction reveals a congressional intent to choose
those courts in exclusive preference to all other adjudicative bodies, including boards
of arbitration, to decide core claims” but ultimately found it did not need to decide
“whether the statutory text itself demonstrates congressional intent to override
arbitration for core claims because [the] case [could] be decided under McMahon’s
third line of analysis . . . .” 403 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 2005) (first citing Sisters of
Providence Health Sys. Inc. v. Summerfield Pine Manor (In re Summerfield Pine
Manor), 219 B.R. 637, 638 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998); and then citing McMahon, 482 U.S.
at 227); see also, Anderson v. Credit One Bank, N.A. (In re Anderson), 884 F.3d 382,
386 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting that parties agreed “arguments regarding legislative history
and statutory text were not raised below” and therefore the court only inquired
“whether arbitration of Anderson’s claim presents the sort of inherent conflict with
the Bankruptcy Code that would overcome the strong congressional preference
for arbitration”).
82
See MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2006) (class
action for automatic stay violation where bankruptcy case was already closed); Mintze
v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 222, 231, 233 (3d Cir. 2006) (rescission;
TILA, HOEPA, and HIFA claims); Hays & Co., 885 F.2d at 1149–50 (3d Cir. 1989)
(non-core securities law action); In re Elec. Mach. Enters., 479 F.3d at 798–99
(contract-based action against third party); Moses, 781 F.3d at 66 (violation of North
Carolina Debt Collection Act).
83
See In re Anderson, 884 F.3d at 390, 392 (violation of discharge); Netflix, Inc. v.
Relativity Media, L.L.C. (In re Relativity Fashion, L.L.C.), 696 F. App’x 26, 30 (2d Cir.
2017) (“collateral attack” on “factual findings and distributions of property”
underlying confirmed plan); In re EPD Inv. Co., L.L.C., 821 F.3d at 1150, 1152
(subordination and disallowance of claims); 344 Individuals v. Giddens (In re Lehman
Bros. Holdings Inc.), 663 F. App’x 65, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2016) (subordination claim
impacting claims allowance and priority in bankruptcy); Moore McCormack Lines,
Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem., Inc. (In re U.S. Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d
631, 634, 641 (2d Cir. 1999) (declaratory action against insurers); Moses, 781 F.3d at
67 (declaratory action impacting claims allowance); In re White Mountain Mining Co.,
403 F.3d at 170 (characterization of investor advances as debt or equity); Gandy v.
Gandy (In re Gandy), 299 F.3d 489, 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2002) (Chapter 11
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variations in the standards they use on the issue. For example,
some courts have applied a bright-line test by which arbitration of
“non-core” matters84 will never conflict with bankruptcy policy and
purposes.85 The Fifth Circuit apparently applies an even narrower
test, requiring the issue to not only be “core” but also to have an
“underlying nature [which] derives exclusively from the provisions

debtor-in-possession’s avoidance actions); Matter of Nat'l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056,
1058 (5th Cir. 1997) (violation of discharge or plan injunction); In re Eber, 687 F.3d at
1130–31 (11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4), (6) non-dischargeability action); Cont’l Ins. Co. v.
Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 671 F.3d 1011, 1014, 1024 (9th
Cir. 2012) (breach of contract claim asserted against estate).
84
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) designates “core matters” to include:
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interests for the
purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11 but
not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal
injury tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of
distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the
estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims
against the estate;
(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or
the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims; and
(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters under chapter 15
of title 11.
28 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
85
See, e.g., In re Elec. Mach. Enters., 479 F.3d at 796 (“In general, bankruptcy
courts do not have the discretion to decline to enforce an arbitration agreement
relating to a non-core proceeding.” (citing Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Shell Oil
Co. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 226 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2000)); Hays &
Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1150 (3d Cir. 1989);
In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d at 640 (“[N]on-core proceedings . . . are unlikely to
present a conflict sufficient to override by implication the presumption in favor
of arbitration.”).
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of the Bankruptcy Code.”86 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has
stated that “the core versus non-core distinction . . . ‘though
relevant, is not alone dispositive.’ ”87 And unlike other circuits, the
Second Circuit has stated that the conflict with bankruptcy
purposes must be a “severe conflict.”88
The courts of appeals have been remarkably similar, however,
in their identification of the bankruptcy policies potentially at
issue with the FAA, though as this Article discusses below, they
have too narrowly focused on centralization and judicial
economy.89 The Fifth Circuit in National Gypsum identified the
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code as “including the goal of
centralized resolution of purely bankruptcy issues, the need to
protect creditors and reorganizing debtors from piecemeal
litigation, and the undisputed power of a bankruptcy court to
enforce its own orders.”90 The Second Circuit, giving as examples
the automatic stay and the bankruptcy court’s broad equitable
powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), has stated that the core purposes
of bankruptcy “allow the bankruptcy court to centralize all
disputes concerning property of the debtor’s estate so
that reorganization can proceed efficiently, unimpeded by
uncoordinated proceedings in other arenas.”91 The Fourth Circuit
has noted that the “very purpose of bankruptcy is to modify the
rights of debtors and creditors, and Congress intended to
centralize disputes about a debtor’s assets and legal obligations in
the bankruptcy courts.”92 In applying this test, courts of appeals

86
In re Gandy, 299 F.3d at 495 (emphasis added); see also In re Mintze, 434 F.3d
at 231 (“[W]e believe that nonenforcement of an otherwise applicable arbitration
provision turns on the underlying nature of the proceedings, i.e., whether the
proceeding derives exclusively from the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and, if so,
whether the arbitration proceeding would conflict with the purposes of the Code.”)
(quoting In re Nat’l Gypsum, 118 F.3d at 1067).
87
In re Eber, 687 F.3d at 1130. No court of appeals applying the McMahon test
has found a non-core matter to be excepted from the FAA, however. See, e.g., Julian
Ellis, A Comparative Law Approach: Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements in
American Insolvency Proceedings, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 141, 171 (2018) (noting that “the
hesitation [of some courts] to subscribe to a categorical approach seems more to do
with the ‘core’ side of the equation than the ‘non-core’ side”).
88
In re Anderson, 884 F.3d at 387; see also In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d at 641
(indicating that court must find “arbitration will seriously jeopardize a particular core
bankruptcy proceeding”).
89
See infra Section IV.b.
90
118 F.3d at 1069.
91
In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d at 640 (citations omitted).
92
Philips v. Congelton (In re White Mountain Mining Co.), 403 F.3d 164,169 (4th
Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted).

2019]

EXPRESS PRECLUSION OF THE FAA

649

have affirmed lower courts that refused to order arbitration of the
following: discharge violations,93 actions to enforce the terms of a
confirmed Chapter 11 plan,94 subordination or objections to
claims against the estate,95 a Chapter 11 reorganization trust’s
declaratory action against insurers to establish rights as part of
conditional settlement with employees who had filed mass tort
personal injury claims against the estate,96 a Chapter 11 debtor
in possession’s avoidance actions against third parties under
the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer and strong-arm
provisions,97 and non-dischargeability actions under Bankruptcy
Code §§ 523(a)(2), (4) or (6).98 On the other hand, courts of appeals
have reversed and ordered lower courts to order arbitration of the
following: a class action suit brought in a closed bankruptcy case
for violation of the automatic stay;99 a Chapter 13 debtor’s action
for rescission of a mortgage and claims under the Truth in Lending
Act, the Home Owners Equity Protection Act of 1994, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, and Pennsylvania consumer protection
laws;100 securities laws actions brought by a Chapter 11 trustee

93

Henry v. Educ. Fin. Serv. (In re Henry), 944 F.3d 587 (5th Cir. 2019); Anderson
v. Credit One Bank (In re Anderson), 884 F.3d 382, 387–88 (2d Cir. 2018).
94
Netflix, Inc. v. Relativity Media, L.L.C. (In re Relativity Fashion, L.L.C.), 696
F. App’x 26, 30 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Matter of Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056,
1058 (5th Cir. 1997) (declaratory judgment whether collection efforts barred by
discharge or plan injunction).
95
344 Individuals v. Giddens (In re Lehman Bros.), 663 F. App’x 65, 67 (2d Cir.
2016); see also Moses v. CashCall, Inc., 781 F.3d 63 (4th Cir. 2015) (Chapter 13
debtor’s proceeding objecting to claim against estate, seeking to declare loan illegal
and void); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re Thorpe Insulation Co.), 671
F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2012) (objection by Chapter 11 debtor in possession to proof of
claim against estate).
96
Moore McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem., Inc.
(In re U.S. Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 641 (2d Cir. 1999).
97
Gandy v. Gandy (In re Gandy), 299 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Kirkland
v. Rund (In re EPD Inv. Co., L.L.C.), 821 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016) (fraudulent
conveyance, subordination and disallowance actions brought by Chapter 7 trustee
against creditor who had filed proof of claim against estate).
98
Ackerman v. Eber (In re Eber), 687 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2012).
99
MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2006).
100
Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 222, 226, 233, (3d Cir.
2006); see also Moses, 781 F.3d at 66 (claim for money damages by a Chapter 13 debtor
against a lender under a North Carolina consumer protection statute).
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against third parties;101 and a proceeding to determine that funds
allegedly held in constructive trust by a third party were property
of the bankruptcy estate.102
II. EXPRESS PRECLUSION BY 28 U.S.C. § 1334
This Article argues that there is ample evidence within the
jurisdictional provisions of the 1978 and 1984 bankruptcy
amendments of Congress’s intent to broadly displace the FAA for
all bankruptcy-related matters. A “later enacted statute . . . can
sometimes operate to amend or even repeal an earlier statutory
provision,” though “ ‘repeals by implication are not favored’ and
will not be presumed unless the ‘intention of the legislature to
repeal [is] clear and manifest.’ ”103 While the legislature may do
violence to its own earlier legislation, courts should be cautious not
to do the same on the basis of an incorrect assumption regarding
the legislature’s intent. Thus courts “will not infer a statutory
repeal ‘unless the later statute “expressly contradict[s] the original
act” ’ or unless such a construction ‘is absolutely necessary . . . in
order that [the] words [of the later statute] shall have any meaning
at all.”104 “Outside these limited circumstances, a statute dealing
with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a
later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.”105
But no mere inference of intent to displace prior legislation is
necessary for the current bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions,
which express clear intent to repeal any inconsistent statute. The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, enacted more than fifty
years after the FAA, provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) that
“[n]otwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive
jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the
district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of

101

Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149,
1149, 1156–57 (3d Cir. 1989).
102
Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc. (In re Elec. Mach.
Enters., Inc.), 479 F.3d 791, 797–99 (11th Cir. 2007).
103
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007)
(quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981)).
104
Id. at 662–63 (quoting Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988)); see also
Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (“An implied repeal will only be found where
provisions in two statutes are in ‘irreconcilable conflict,’ or where the latter Act covers
the whole subject of the earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute.’ ” (quoting
Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936))); Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503
(“[T]he intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest.”).
105
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 663 (quotation and citation omitted).
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all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related
to cases under title 11.”106 Although repealed in 1984, its
replacement in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) similarly provides that
[e]xcept as provided in subsection (e)(2),107 and notwithstanding
any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court
or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings
arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title
11.108

In both versions, the statute includes the phrase “notwithstanding
any Act of Congress,” clearly showing that the statute is intended
to displace at least some other acts of Congress. Thus, there
should be no need to fear that Congress did not intend to repeal or
modify its earlier legislation and no need for a presumption
against repeal or preclusion.
True, it could be argued that the FAA does not fall within the
scope of such preclusion. Strictly speaking, the bankruptcy statute
does not mention the FAA or arbitration and refers instead to
statutes conferring exclusive “jurisdiction” on other “courts”
without specifically mentioning non-judicial adjudicators.109 But
in analyzing that scope, because of the express language of
preclusion, there should be no general presumption against
preclusion in analyzing the statute. Instead, ordinary principles
of statutory interpretation should govern the issue of whether
divestment of jurisdiction by the FAA in favor of non-judicial
arbitration falls within the scope of the “notwithstanding” clause.
As the Supreme Court has stated, courts should rely “on
traditional rules of statutory interpretation [and that] does not
change because the case involves multiple federal statutes.”110
106
Act of November 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–598 (HR 8200), Pub. L. No. 95–598,
92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1471 (1978)) (emphasis added).
107
Section 1334(e)(2) protects the power of the court with bankruptcy jurisdiction
to supervise bankruptcy professionals by granting exclusive jurisdiction “over all
claims or causes of action that involve construction of section 327 of title 11, United
States Code, or rules relating to disclosure requirements under section 327.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(e)(2) (2018). Section 327 governs employment of professionals to assist and
represent the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (2018).
108
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2018) (emphasis added).
109
See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(2) (2018).
110
POM Wonderful L.L.C. v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 112 (2014) (citing FDA
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 137–39 (2000), superseded by
statute in part, Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No.
111–31, § 907(d)(3)(A)–(B), 123, Stat. 1776 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387g)); see also, e.g.,
Noll, supra note 46, at 703–07 (explaining why the FAA should not be treated as a
“super-statute”).
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The legislative history of the bankruptcy provisions makes
clear that the jurisdictional grant in § 1334(b) was intended to
ensure that federal courts hearing bankruptcy cases would have
the jurisdiction and the ability to oversee all matters that could
affect the bankruptcy case. The Supreme Court has explained:
The jurisdictional grant in § 1334(b) was a distinct departure
from the jurisdiction conferred under previous Acts, which had
been limited to either possession of property by the debtor or
consent as a basis for jurisdiction. We agree with the views
expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pacor,
Inc. v. Higgins, that “Congress intended to grant comprehensive
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal
efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the
bankruptcy estate” and that the “related to” language of § 1334(b)
must be read to give district courts (and bankruptcy courts under
§ 157(a)) jurisdiction over more than simple proceedings
involving the property of the debtor or the estate.111

Comments in the House Report show specific concern that “the
extra expense entailed by the estate in litigating outside the
bankruptcy court” or costs incurred in litigating “over whether the

111
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (citing S. REP. NO. 95–989,
2nd Sess., pt.1 at 153–54, 1978; Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (1984),
overruled in part by Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 135–36
(1995)). Even with respect to the earlier Bankruptcy Act of 1895, the Supreme Court
has indicated the strong legislative intent to have all matters affecting the allowance
of claims and liquidation and distribution of estate property heard by the district
courts exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction. In finding that taxing authorities “must
submit to appropriate requirements by the controlling power” to “participate in the
assets of a bankrupt” lest the “orderly and expeditious proceedings would be
impossible and a fundamental purpose of the Bankruptcy Act would be frustrated,”
the Court quoted an earlier decision with respect to claims administration:
We think it is a necessary conclusion from these and other provisions of the
act that the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts in all ‘proceedings in
bankruptcy’ is intended to be exclusive of all other courts, and that such
proceedings include, among others, all matters of administration, such as the
allowance, rejection, and reconsideration of claims, the reduction of the
estates to money, and its distribution, the determination of the preferences
and priorities to be accorded to claims presented for allowance and payment
in regular course, and the supervision and control of the trustees and others
who are employed to assist them. * * * A distinct purpose of the bankruptcy
act is to subject the administration of the estates of bankrupts to the control
of tribunals clothed with authority and charged with the duty of proceeding
to final settlement and distribution in a summary way, as are the courts of
bankruptcy.
New York v. Irving Tr. Co., 288 U.S. 329, 332–33 (1933) (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S. 205, 217–18 (1912)).
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bankruptcy court has jurisdiction” could tax the estate or give
unfair “bargaining leverage against” the trustee to parties who
owe the estate money.112
An interpretation of the FAA as requiring federal courts
exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction to stay “non-core” or
“insufficiently core” matters in favor of arbitration would be
disruptive to the system Congress intended through § 1334 no less
than divestment of jurisdiction in favor of another court. For
example, even though the automatic stay is “one of the
fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy
laws,”113 the Second Circuit in MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Hill
required arbitration of an alleged violation of the automatic stay,
holding under the McMahon test that arbitration of the alleged
violation “would not necessarily jeopardize or inherently conflict
with the Bankruptcy Code.”114 As such, the Court of Appeals found
that through the FAA, parties were able to contractually deprive
bankruptcy courts of the power to enforce their own orders.115
Similarly, despite § 1334(b)’s clear intent to provide a forum
within the federal courts for trustees and debtors in possession to
adjudicate claims by the estate against third parties, several
courts of appeals have applied the McMahon test to
divest bankruptcy courts of such jurisdiction and therefore deprive
creditors, trustees, and the court itself of the right and
power to monitor and participate in matters affecting the
bankruptcy estate.116
For example, in characterizing an action for turnover of
property of the estate as a mere claim of a debtor-in-possession
against a third party, the Eleventh Circuit characterized a matter
as “non-core” and therefore reversed and remanded the matter to

112

H.R. REP. No. 95–595, xv, at 45–46 (1978).
Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494,
503 (1986).
114
436 F.3d 104,110–11 (2d Cir. 2006).
115
Id. at 109–10. But see, Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996)
(“Courts invested with the judicial power of the United States have certain inherent
authority to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their
traditional responsibilities.” (first citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,
43–46 (1991); then citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962); and
then citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)).
116
See, e.g., Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470, 492 (5th Cir.
2002); Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002); Mintze
v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 222, 233 (3d Cir. 2006); MBNA Am.
Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc.,
479 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2007).
113
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the bankruptcy court “with instructions to compel the parties to
arbitrate in accordance with the terms of their arbitration
agreement.”117 In Moses v. CashCall, Inc.¸118 the Fourth Circuit
reversed the bankruptcy court and ordered arbitration of a
Chapter 13 debtor’s counterclaim119 against a creditor for damages
under the North Carolina Debt Collection Act, even as the dissent
expressed real concern that the particular “tribal arbitration
procedure specified in the loan agreement [was] ‘illusory,’ ‘a sham,’
and ‘unconscionable.’ ”120
Nothing within § 1334 or the Bankruptcy Code makes
exception for or requires a federal court exercising bankruptcy
jurisdiction to divest itself of such jurisdiction in favor of
arbitration or order arbitration.121 Nor does the FAA contain
language indicating an intent to modify Congress’s structure for
bankruptcy law. Congress has had the opportunity to do so. For
example, the Arbitration Act was amended in 1988 to provide that
enforcement “of arbitral agreements, confirmation of arbitral
awards, and execution upon judgments based on orders confirming
such awards shall not be refused on the basis of the Act of State

117
Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc. (In re Elec. Mach.
Enters., Inc.), 479 F.3d 791, 798-99 (11th Cir. 2007).
118
781 F.3d 63, 66 (4th Cir. 2015).
119
Counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate
are statutorily core matters. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2018). However, the Supreme
Court has held that Section 157(b)(2)(C) violated Article III of the Constitution to the
extent it authorized non-Article III bankruptcy courts, as opposed to the district
courts, from entering final orders over such matters if not resolved in the process of
ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim and if without the consent of the parties. Stern v.
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011). The Court subsequently ruled that bankruptcy
courts could enter final orders over such matters with the consent of the parties,
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1949 (2015), or could issue
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to an Article III district court to enter
final orders. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 38 (2014).
120
781 F.3d at 67 (Niemeyer, J., writing for the court in part and dissenting
in part).
121
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) requires a court exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction, upon
timely motion, to abstain from hearing a non-core matter based upon state law “if an
action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (2018). It is questionable whether an arbitration
proceeding constitutes “a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.” And in any event,
that provision applies only to state law non-core matters for which the federal court
did not have diversity or other jurisdiction and in which the proceeding had already
commenced. Id.
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doctrine.”122 But the Act has not been amended since the 1978
Bankruptcy Code or the 1984 bankruptcy amendments to repeal
the effect of § 1334 upon the FAA.123
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “generalities” in an
earlier federal statute “should not lightly be construed to frustrate
a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute.”124 Thus, in
United States v. Estate of Romani, the Court found the later
enacted Tax Lien Act of 1966’s more specific rule trumped the rule
in the more general federal priority statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3713(a).
The Tax Lien Act stated that federal tax liens “shall not be valid”
against judgment lien creditors until prescribed notice was given,
while the federal priority statute, “virtually unchanged since its
enactment in 1797,” provided generally that the United States
Government “ ‘shall be paid first’ when a decedent’s estate cannot
pay all of its debts.”125 As explained by the Court, the later tax
statute was “the more specific statute, and its provisions are
comprehensive, reflecting an obvious attempt to accommodate the
strong policy objections to the enforcement of secret liens” and
“represents Congress’ detailed judgment as to when the
Government’s claims for unpaid taxes should yield to many
different sorts of interests.”126 Similarly, the highly detailed and
comprehensive Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and its jurisdictional
provisions within title 28, intended by Congress “to grant
comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they
might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected
with the bankruptcy estate,”127 should not be deemed retroactively
eroded by the short and much more general FAA, enacted more
than fifty years before and not substantially changed thereafter.128
122

9 U.S.C. § 15, added by Pub. L. No. 100-669, § 1, Nov. 16, 1988, 102 Stat. 3969.
Indeed, the principal sections of the Arbitration Act, sections 1 through 9, have
not been amended since the Act was codified into the United States Code in 1947,
other than a minor amendment to section 7 in 1951, Oct. 31, 1951, ch 655, § 14, 65
Stat. 715, and a technical amendment to section 4 in 1954, Sept. 3, 1954, ch 1263,
§ 19, 68 Stat. 1233.
124
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530 (1998) (quoting
Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 635 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
125
Id. at 519–24.
126
Id. at 532.
127
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (first citing H.R. REP. NO.
95–595, at 43–48 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6004–09; and then
citing Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (1984)).
128
The largest change to the FAA after 1984 was the addition of a new Chapter 3
providing for recognition and enforcement of the Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, added Aug. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–369, 104
Stat. 448. Through this amendment Congress again showed its ability to make clear
123
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Bankruptcy law also holds a special place in federal
jurisprudence. Article I of the United States Constitution
expressly grants Congress the power to establish “uniform Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”129
This power “includes the power to discharge the debtor from his
contracts and legal liabilities” and the “grant to Congress involves
the power to impair the obligation of contracts, [something] the
States were forbidden to do.”130 While the FAA may have been
intended “to place an arbitration agreement ‘upon the same
footing as other contracts,’ ”131 the Bankruptcy Code in its central
provisions authorizes the modification of contractual rights.132
Indeed, this would not be the first time that bankruptcy laws
constitute a rare example of precluding or partially repealing other
earlier contrary statutes. The Court in Estate of Romani listed the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as “an additional context in which another
federal statute was given effect despite the [federal] priority
statute’s133 literal, unconditional text,” resolving “the tension
between the new bankruptcy provisions and the priority statute
by applying the former and thus treating the Government like any
other general creditor.”134 The Full Faith and Credit Act135 is
another longstanding but general statute that the Supreme Court
has suggested has been partially repealed or precluded by
bankruptcy laws. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,
the Court noted that as “an historical matter, we have seldom, if

when Chapter 1 of the Arbitration Act should apply to subsequent statutory
provisions. 9 U.S.C. § 307 (2018) (“Chapter 1 [9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 ] applies to actions and
proceedings brought under this chapter [9 U.S.C. §§ 301–07] to the extent chapter 1
[9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16] is not in conflict with this chapter [9 U.S.C. §§ 301–307] or the
Inter-American Convention as ratified by the United States.”). Yet, Congress has not
similarly indicated that the FAA should apply to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 or its
jurisdictional provisions.
129
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
130
Railway Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 466 (1982) (quoting
Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 186 (1902)).
131
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
68-96, at 1 (1924)).
132
See, e.g., Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain Mining Co.,
L.L.C.), 403 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating the “very purpose of bankruptcy is
to modify the rights of debtors and creditors” (internal citation and quotation
omitted)).
133
31 U.S.C. § 3713 (2018).
134
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 531 (1998) (first citing Guar.
Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Surety Co., 224 U.S. 152, 158–60 (1912); and then
citing Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 317–19 (1925)).
135
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2018).
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ever, held that a federal statute impliedly repealed § 1738,”136 but
referenced the holding in Brown v. Felson137 as a possible
exception.138 In Brown, the Court noted that in 1970 “Congress
altered § 17 [of the Bankruptcy Act] to require creditors to
apply to the bankruptcy court for adjudication of certain
dischargeablility questions,” including those under the
predecessor to the current exception for intentional torts.139
Having found “the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over these § 17
claims as ‘exclusive,’ ” the Court concluded that “it would be
inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1970 amendments to adopt
a policy of res judicata which takes these § 17 questions away from
bankruptcy courts and forces them back into state courts.”140
Although Brown was decided under the old Bankruptcy Act,
§ 523(c) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 similarly provides
that debts for intentional torts under § 523(a)(2), (4) or (6) are
discharged unless “on request of the creditor to whom such debt is
owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such
debt to be excepted from discharge[.]”141 The Court has continued
to find applicable under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code Brown’s
holding that state court judgments do not have res judicata or
claim preclusive effect142 on a bankruptcy court’s determination of
non-dischargeability for intentional torts.143 In an unpublished
opinion, the Fifth Circuit has also found that the bankruptcy
jurisdiction provisions were intended to override the requirement
for administrative exhaustion under the earlier enacted Contract

136
516 U.S. 367, 380 (1996) (first citing Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474
U.S. 518, 523–24 (1986) (Anti-Injunction Act does not limit § 1738); then citing Migra
v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83–85 (1984) (§ 1983 does not limit
claim preclusion under § 1738); then citing Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456
U.S. 461, 468–76 (1982) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not limit § 1738);
and then citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96–105 (1980) (§ 1983 does not limit
issue preclusion under § 1738)).
137
442 U.S. 127, 138–39 (1979).
138
Matsushita Electric Indust. Co., 516 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1996) (describing
Brown’s holding as “declining to give claim preclusive effect to prior state court debt
collection proceeding in federal bankruptcy suit, without discussing § 1738, state law
or implied repeals”).
139
Brown, 442 U.S. at 129–30.
140
Id. at 136.
141
11 U.S.C. § 523(c) (2018).
142
However, the Supreme Court has found that state court judgments may have
collateral estoppel or issue preclusive effect on discharge exception proceedings
pursuant to Section 523(a). Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.11 (1991).
143
See, e.g., Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 319 (2003) (“Brown v.
Felsen . . . governs the outcome here.”).
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Disputes Act.144 Noting that “a later enacted statute may limit the
scope of an earlier statute,” that “the Bankruptcy Code does not
specifically mention administrative exhaustion,” and based on the
legislative history and purposes of the bankruptcy statutes, the
court concluded that “Congress intended these broad statutory
provisions to override the [Contract Disputes Act]’s procedural
requirements due to the perceived need for virtually all
bankruptcy-related proceedings to be handled inexpensively and
expeditiously in but one forum.”145
Therefore, even in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions
finding other federal statutes not to override the FAA, bankruptcy
is distinguishable.146 The jurisdictional provisions in § 1334,
together with the legislative history and purposes of the 1978
amendments make clear that courts exercising bankruptcy
jurisdiction over any matter related to a bankruptcy case may
continue to exercise that jurisdiction notwithstanding any
agreement that would purport to require arbitration.
III. IMPLIED PRECLUSION BY 28 U.S.C. § 1334
A.

Implied Preclusion Based on Text and History

Even if § 1334(b) were read as not expressly repealing the
FAA, the clause still demonstrates congressional intent through
its text, history, and purpose to impliedly repeal the FAA. Much
of the Supreme Court’s recent expansion of the FAA has involved
preemption over state laws or rules seen to impede or impair
arbitration rights.147 But in POM Wonderful L.L.C. v. Coca-Cola
144
United States v. MacLeod Co. (In re MacLeod Co.), 935 F.2d 270 (6th
Cir. 1991).
145
Id. at *11, *14–15.
146
Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code has also been treated differently from other
statutes for purposes of State sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment. In
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, the Supreme Court, highlighting that
bankruptcy at heart is an in rem proceeding, including the discharge, held that
bankruptcy court adjudication of the dischargeability of a student loan owed to a state
entity “is not a suit against a State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.” 541
U.S. 440, 450–51 (2004). The Court expanded that ruling two years later to cover
“orders ancillary to the bankruptcy courts’ in rem jurisdiction, like orders directing
turnover of preferential transfers,” finding that “the history of the Bankruptcy Clause,
which shows that the Framers’ primary goal was to prevent competing sovereigns’
interference with the debtor’s discharge,” demonstrates that the States implicitly
agreed not to assert sovereign immunity over such matters. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v.
Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373 (2006).
147
See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1429
(2017) (Kentucky common law rule limiting ability to authorize waiver of right to court
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Co., the Supreme Court emphasized the difference between
preemption and preclusion. In this sense, preemption involves the
relationship between federal and state law while preclusion
involves the relationship between two federal laws. As the
Supreme Court explained:
In pre-emption cases, the question is whether state law is
pre-empted by a federal statute, or in some instances, a federal
agency action.
This case, however, concerns the alleged
preclusion of a cause of action under one federal statute by
the provisions of another federal statute. So the state-federal
balance does not frame the inquiry. Because this is a preclusion
case, any “presumption against pre-emption” has no force.148

Instead, “[a]nalysis of the statutory text, aided by established
principles of interpretation, controls.”149 In POM Wonderful, the
defendant argued that the plaintiff’s false advertising claim under
the Lanham Act was precluded by labeling requirements under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). The Court,
noting that no “textual provision in either statute discloses a
purpose to bar” Lanham claims over labels regulated by the FDCA,
found that the “structures of the FDCA and the Lanham Act”
complemented rather than conflicted with each other and
permitted actions under either statute.150 Additionally, the Court
found no conflict in the purposes of the two statutes.151 Similarly,
in its FAA cases, the Court has looked to the text, the history, and
the purposes of the FAA and the federal statute supposedly in
in power of attorney); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 466–67 (2015)
(California common law unconscionability doctrine against waiver of class arbitration
right); AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337–38 (2011) (same);
Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 530–31 (2012) (West Virginia
common law principle against waivers of arbitration in nursing home admission
agreements); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 351 (2008) (California statute referring
certain disputes initially to an administrative agency); Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,
539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) (construing broadly FAA’s use of term “involving commerce” to
the “broadest permissible exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause”); Doctor’s Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684 (1996) (involving a Montana statute making
arbitration clauses unenforceable unless typed in underlined capital letters on first
page of contract); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 486 (1987) (involving a California
statute providing that actions for collection of wages may be maintained without
regard to private agreement to arbitrate); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
7–8 (1984) (noting FAA requires state courts, not just federal courts, to stay
proceedings and order arbitration).
148
Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 111 (2014) (citing Wyeth
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 563, 565 (2009)).
149
Id. at 112.
150
Id. at 113, 115.
151
Id. at 117.
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conflict with the FAA to determine whether one impliedly
precludes or repeals the other. In Epic Systems, the Supreme
Court generally explained:
When confronted with two Acts of Congress allegedly touching on
the same topic, this Court is not at “liberty to pick and choose
among congressional enactments” and must instead strive “to
give effect to both.” . . . A party seeking to suggest that two
statutes cannot be harmonized, and that one displaces the other,
bears the heavy burden of showing “a clearly expressed
congressional intention” that such a result should follow. . . . The
intention must be “clear and manifest.” . . . And in approaching
a claimed conflict, we come armed with the “stron[g]
presum[ption]” that repeals by implication are “disfavored” and
that “Congress will specifically address” preexisting law when it
wishes to suspend its normal operations in a later statute.152

As discussed in the previous section, the jurisdictional
provisions of both the 1978 and 1984 bankruptcy amendments
show such a “clearly expressed congressional intention” that
no other federal statute—including the FAA—may deprive
bankruptcy courts of their original jurisdiction to hear
bankruptcy-related matters.153 This clear congressional intent is
further supported by the legislative history.154
Indeed, the first court of appeals to address the issue after
the 1978 Bankruptcy Amendments initially found that the
bankruptcy jurisdiction provisions “impliedly modif[ied] the
Arbitration Act.”155 The Third Circuit in Zimmerman noted that
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
significantly expands the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts and is
based on the notion that to protect the positions of both the
bankrupt and its creditors, bankruptcy actions should not be
subject to unnecessary delay and all claims and issues relevant
to such actions should be resolved in one expeditious proceeding,

152

138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018) (first quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
551 (1974); then quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515
U.S. 528, 533 (1995); and then quoting United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439,
452–53 (1988)).
153
See supra Part III.
154
See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
155
Zimmerman v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1983); see also,
Cross Elec. Co., Inc. v. John Driggs Co., Inc. (In re Cross Elec. Co. Inc.), 9 B.R. 408,
410–11 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981).
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finding that “[w]hile the sanctity of arbitration is a fundamental
federal concern, it cannot be said to occupy a position of similar
importance.”156 The court, relying upon Wilko, focused primarily
on the “not easily reconcilable” competing policies behind the two
statutes,157 but also quoted the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1471158 and its
legislative history.159
However, the Third Circuit revisited Zimmerman six years
later in Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.160 and decided to depart from its earlier reasoning based on
subsequent developments. In 1984, Congress had amended the
bankruptcy jurisdiction provisions of Title 28 in an attempt to
address the Supreme Court’s holding in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.161 Northern Pipeline
held that at least a portion of the 1978 amendments’ delegation of
authority to the non-Article III bankruptcy courts violated
Article III of the Constitution.162 The court in Hays, noting that
the 1984 amendments required certain types of claims
to be brought in the federal district courts or in state courts,
concluded that the “congressional policy of consolidating all
bankruptcy-related matters in the bankruptcy court, relied upon
by [the Third Circuit] in Zimmerman, is no longer applicable.”163

156

712 F.2d at 56, 59.
Id. at 59.
158
Id. at 58 n.3.
159
Id. at 58 (“The House Report reiterated the need for expanded jurisdiction in
the bankruptcy court [and] further stated that, as a result of the increased
jurisdiction, ‘all matters and proceedings that arise in connection with bankruptcy
cases’ may now be tried in one action before the bankruptcy court.” (quoting H. REP.
NO. 95–595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6007–6010)).
160
Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149,
1159–60 (3d Cir. 1989).
161
458 U.S. 50, 85–87 (1982), superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–353, 98 Stat. 333, as recognized in
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 486 (2011).
162
Under the 1978 amendments, bankruptcy jurisdiction was nominally placed in
the district courts but then entirely and automatically transferred to the bankruptcy
courts. Northern Pipeline involved an action brought by a Chapter 11
debtor-in-possession against a non-creditor third party under state law. It therefore
did not arise under Title 11 or arise in the case, but related to the bankruptcy case to
the extent success would bring additional funds into the estate. The plurality of the
Court found that to enable a bankruptcy court to “issue final judgments, which are
binding and enforceable even in the absence of an appeal[]” over such matters
“impermissibly removed most, if not all of ‘the essential attributes of the judicial
power’ from the Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III
adjunct.” 458 U.S. at 85–87.
163
Hays, 885 F.2d at 1160.
157
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Yet the Hays opinion does not seem to appreciate that the
1984 amendments affected the allocation of authority between the
Article III district court and the non-Article III bankruptcy court,
and not the scope of jurisdiction granted to federal courts
exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction as a whole.164 Nor in concluding
that Congress had abandoned a policy of “consolidating all
bankruptcy-related matters” in a single court does the Third
Circuit mention that through the 1984 amendments Congress
designated the bankruptcy courts as “a unit of the district court”165
or that the district courts were given the power—including on
their own motion—to “withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or
proceeding” that the district court had referred to the bankruptcy
court.166 An earlier version of the proposed amendments passed
by the Senate would have much more broadly required abstention
regarding purely state law claims. But that proposal was
ultimately deleted. As explained by one House Representative:
The change in the definition in the Senate-passed bill would have
contradicted the basic purposes of the consolidated jurisdiction
we adopted in 1978 in response to the recommendations of the
commission on bankruptcy laws.
Finally, it would have
dissipated the assets of the estate by creating a multiplicity of
forums for the adjudication of parts of a bankruptcy case.167

The court in Hays also pointed to subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, such as McMahon and the overturning of Wilko by
Rodriguez de Quijas, as warranting reversal of its conclusion in
Zimmerman that the jurisdictional provisions provided statutory
evidence of a congressional intent to supersede the FAA.168 As the
court stated:
The message we get from these recent cases is that we must
carefully determine whether any underlying purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code would be adversely affected by enforcing an

164
“Section 157 allocates the authority to enter final judgment between the
bankruptcy court and the district court. That allocation does not implicate questions
of subject matter jurisdiction.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 480 (2011)
(citation omitted).
165
Hays, 885 F.2d at 1160; 28 U.S.C § 151 (2018).
166
28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (2018).
167
130 CONG. REC. 20, 227–28 (1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
168
Hays, 885 F.2d at 1160.
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arbitration clause and that we should enforce such a clause
unless that effect would seriously jeopardize the objectives of
the Code.169

But as discussed above,170 it is dangerous to overgeneralize the
recent holdings of the Supreme Court on the FAA, given that none
of the federal statutes at issue in those cases had language similar
to the bankruptcy jurisdiction provisions. The court also noted
that in McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas the Supreme Court had
found the FAA to require arbitration of claims under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 despite the fact that § 27 of the Exchange
Act granted district courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims
under the Exchange Act.171 But as noted above, the Supreme
Court in McMahon analyzed only whether the anti-waiver
provision of the Exchange Act was inconsistent with the FAA and
did not discuss how mandatory arbitration could be consistent
with a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts.172 Nor
did the statutes at issue include clear preclusion language
overriding any act of Congress to the contrary. So even if
McMahon or Rodriguez de Quijas could be read to include a
holding that courts should not imply an exception to the FAA
through a mere affirmative grant of jurisdiction to a federal court,
the exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 is not merely implied.
Lower courts have found other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code to preempt the FAA based on text and legislative history
even where the statute makes no express reference to arbitration.
Most notably, courts have concluded that the automatic stay under
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) applies to and stays arbitration, even though
there is no express reference to arbitration in the statute. The
legislative history to § 362(a) makes clear that the broad language
staying “the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial,
administrative, or other action or proceeding”173 was intended to
include arbitration. The House Report for the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 states that the automatic stay under § 362(a) “is broad
[and a]ll proceedings are stayed, including arbitration, license
revocation, administrative, and judicial proceedings. Proceeding
in this sense encompasses civil actions as well, and all proceedings
169

Id. at 1161. Additionally, while all districts have, through local rules, provided
for the automatic referral of bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy courts within their
district, they are not required to do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2018).
170
See supra notes 46–70 and accompanying text.
171
Hays, 885 F.2d at 1162 n. 12.
172
See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
173
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2018).
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even if they are not before governmental tribunals.”174 As noted
by then Judge Alito, under a “long-standing exception to th[e]
general rule” requiring enforcement of an arbitration award, the
“automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code promotes a
public policy sufficient to preclude enforcement of an award that
violates its terms or interferes with its purposes.”175 Additionally,
while the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute permits certain matters
to be adjudicated in other forums, it grants “original” jurisdiction
over bankruptcy-related matters in the federal courts, and also
authorizes removal of bankruptcy-related matters initiated in
state courts to the federal courts in at least certain instances.
While the grant is “not exclusive” with respect to such matters,
parties are not necessarily at liberty to seek relief in a forum with
concurrent jurisdiction during the pendency of the bankruptcy, or
even attempt to negotiate or otherwise pursue matters in a
non-judicial manner without first obtaining authorization from
the bankruptcy court. For example, the automatic stay broadly
stays collection efforts against the debtor or property of the estate
unless relief is first sought and obtained from the bankruptcy
court.176 Additionally, the rights of the debtor against third parties
become property of the estate,177 and the bankruptcy trustee
becomes the representative of the estate with the right to sue and
be sued.178 The Bankruptcy Code generally requires the trustee to
seek bankruptcy court approval before selling or using property of
the estate179 or before compromising or settling a controversy.180
This normally requires a hearing and notice to all parties

174

H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977) (emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO.
95–989, at 50 (1978) (“The scope of this paragraph is broad. All proceedings are stayed,
including arbitration, administrative, and judicial proceedings. Proceeding in this
sense encompasses civil actions and all proceedings even if they are not before
governmental tribunals.”).
175
Acands, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., 435 F.3d 252, 258–59 (3d Cir.
2006) (“We agree that the automatic stay applied to the arbitration and that the panel
should have halted the arbitration once it became apparent that proceeding further
could negatively impact the bankruptcy estate. We also hold that the arbitration
award is invalid because it diminishes the property of the estate.”).
176
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2018).
177
11 U.S.C. § 541 (2018).
178
11 U.S.C. § 323 (2018).
179
11 U.S.C. § 363 (2018).
180
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.
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in interest affected by the bankruptcy proceeding, including
creditors, and the court must make a determination that the use,
sale, or compromise is in the best interest of the estate.181
In this sense, the grant of concurrent jurisdiction over
bankruptcy-related matters differs from the statutes at issue in
the Supreme Court’s FAA cases. Rejecting the argument that
“compulsory arbitration is improper because it deprives claimants
of the judicial forum provided for by” the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the Supreme Court noted that Congress had
granted concurrent jurisdiction over such claims to state and
federal courts and concluded that arbitration agreements, “ ‘like
the provision for concurrent jurisdiction, serve to advance the
objective of allowing [claimants] a broader right to select the forum
for resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise.’ ”182
Similarly, the Supreme Court suggested in Rodriguez de Quijas
that the Securities Act of 1933’s grant of concurrent jurisdiction
reflected a congressional decision to give plaintiffs choice over
forum and enforcing arbitration agreements, as a form of
“forum-selection clause,” advanced “the objective of allowing
buyers of securities a broader right to select the forum for
resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise.”183 In
contrast, § 1334’s failure to grant exclusive jurisdiction over all
bankruptcy-related matters does not mean that parties are at full
liberty to use non-bankruptcy forums without first seeking stay
relief or permission from the bankruptcy court. Nor does the
failure to provide exclusive jurisdiction indicate that Congress did
181

See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Moeller (In re Age Ref.,
Inc.), 801 F.3d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 2015) (“A bankruptcy court may approve a
compromise or settlement on motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing
pursuant to Rule 9019, but it should do so ‘only when the settlement is fair and
equitable and in the best interest of the estate.’ ” (quoting In re Foster Mortg. Corp. v.
United Cos. Fin. Corp. (In re Foster Mortg. Corp.), 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995));
Am. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Hoich, 594 F.3d 1015, 1024 (8th Cir. 2010) (“In bankruptcy
proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases, any compromise between the
debtor and his creditors must be approved by the court as fair and equitable.” (quoting
Reynolds v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 861 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1988)); Depoister
v. Mary M. Holloway Found., 36 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 1994) (“In conducting a
hearing under Rule 9019(a), the bankruptcy court is to determine whether the
proposed compromise is fair and equitable, and in the best interests of the bankruptcy
estate.” (first citing Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry,
Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968); and then citing LaSalle Nat’l Bank v.
Holland (In re Am. Reserve Co.), 841 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1987)).
182
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (quoting
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989)).
183
Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 482–83.
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not believe the federal procedural protections in the Bankruptcy
Code are important or subject to waiver—including waiver
in advance through an arbitration agreement. The Court in
Rodriguez de Quijas found that federal procedural protections
such as broad choice of venue and nationwide service of process in
the Securities Act were not protected from waiver since “the grant
of concurrent jurisdiction constitutes explicit authorization for
complainants to waive those protections by filing suit in state
court without possibility of removal to federal court.”184 A similar
conclusion cannot be drawn from the grant of concurrent
jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), because these other features of
title 11 and title 28 do permit removal to federal court and do
protect the party from state court proceedings, at least
temporarily. Moreover, the fact that the bankruptcy provisions
permit concurrent litigation in other forums should not be read to
imply that those provisions permit the bankruptcy courts to be
deprived of their original jurisdiction. To the contrary, the statute
is clear that the federal courts shall have original jurisdiction over
bankruptcy-related matters notwithstanding any act of Congress
to the contrary.185 This is necessary to ensure that not only the
signatories to the arbitration agreement, but all parties with an
interest in the bankruptcy case receive the procedural protection
and oversight given them by the Bankruptcy Code.186 Thus, the
early Third Circuit opinion in Zimmerman was correct to find that
the bankruptcy jurisdictional provisions override the FAA, and the
1984 amendments and Supreme Court’s rulings in McMahon and
Rodriguez de Quijas do not change that conclusion.
B. Implied Preclusion Based on Policy Conflict
Even under McMahon’s “third prong,” the courts of appeals
have too narrowly interpreted the policies behind the 1978 and
1984 bankruptcy amendments when deciding whether arbitration
184

Id. at 482.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
186
In this sense, too, the reasoning in Rodriguez de Quijas is distinguishable.
Quoting Justice Frankfurter’s dissent from Wilko, the Court stated: “There is nothing
in the record before us, nor in the facts of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate
that the arbitral system . . . would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is
entitled.” Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
439 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In contrast, there is nothing to suggest that arbitration between two signatories affords nonsignatory creditors and other parties in interest rights to which they are entitled under the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.
185
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inherently conflicts with bankruptcy policies. As reflected in 28
U.S.C. § 1334, Congressional policy favors having all matters
related to and affecting the bankruptcy proceeding heard in a
centralized federal court with notice to all interested parties, not
merely “core” matters. In narrowly interpreting bankruptcy
policies, the courts of appeals have ignored other important
reasons for Congress to wish for all matters affecting the
bankruptcy estate—whether “core” or “non-core”—to be heard in
the federal courts. In providing broad bankruptcy jurisdiction, the
statute ensures that creditors and other parties in interest
affected by claims by or against the estate have the right to notice
and the opportunity to object or participate, sets forth consistent
rules of procedure, and guarantees that the bankruptcy court is
able to supervise matters affecting the estate as necessary.
“ ‘A fundamental principle of the bankruptcy process is the
collective treatment of all of a debtor’s creditors at one time.’ ”187
This principle is fundamental not only to preserve the parties’ and
courts’ resources, but also to provide opportunity for all creditors
and other interested parties to participate and have notice of the
proceedings. Bankruptcy “is a collective process, designed to
gather together the assets and debts of the debtor and to effect an
equitable distribution of those assets on account of the debts,” and
the “more participation there is; the better this process works.”188
To ensure all affected parties’ interests are protected, the
bankruptcy court is given specific power to monitor and hold open
hearings on all bankruptcy-related matters.189 The right to notice
and to participate in matters affecting the estate are ensured
through the Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure.190 Thus, the courts of appeals have overemphasized the
187
Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017) (quoting 1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L NORTON III,
NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 3:9 (3d ed. 2019)).
188
Owens, 832 F.3d at 732 (citation omitted).
189
For example, Section 105(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:
The court, on its own motion or on the request of a party in interest—
(1) shall hold such status conferences as are necessary to further the
expeditious and economical resolution of the case; and
(2) unless inconsistent with another provision of this title or with
applicable Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, may issue an order
at any such conference prescribing such limitations and conditions as
the court deems appropriate to ensure that the case is handled
expeditiously and economically . . . .
11 U.S.C. § 105(d) (2018).
190
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (2018) (defining “after notice and a hearing”); 11
U.S.C. § 107(a) (2018) (“[A] paper filed in a case under this title and the dockets of a
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fact that under the 1984 bankruptcy amendments, some matters
must be heard by the district court instead of the bankruptcy
court. In doing so, they have failed to appreciate that the
bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court,191 subject to review
by and removal of proceedings by the district court,192 and that
the same Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure apply to
bankruptcy-related proceedings in the district court, giving the
same right to notice and to participate to creditors and other
parties in interest. 193 Thus while, for example, 28 U.S.C. § 157
provides for the district court to hear particular matters194 and for
the bankruptcy court to submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court for certain “non-core”

bankruptcy court are public records and open to examination by an entity at
reasonable times without charge.”); 11 U.S.C. § 342 (2018) (notice); FED. R. BANKR. P.
2002 (certain required notice); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004 (process); FED. R. BANKR. P.
9013 (standard motions); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 (contested matters); FED. R. BANKR.
P. 9019 (compromise and arbitration).
191

In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service shall
constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court for
that district. Each bankruptcy judge, as a judicial officer of the district court,
may exercise the authority conferred under this chapter with respect to any
action, suit, or proceeding and may preside alone and hold a regular or
special session of the court, except as otherwise provided by law or by rule or
order of the district court.
28 U.S.C. § 151 (2018).
192
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2018) (jurisdiction for district courts to hear appeals
from the bankruptcy courts); 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (2018) (district court’s power to
remove proceedings previously referred to the bankruptcy court).
193
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 (“The Bankruptcy Rules and Forms govern
procedure in cases under Title 11 of the United States Code.”); see also, e.g., Phar-Mor,
Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1237 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[W]e believe that
nothing in the Bankruptcy Rules, and in Bankruptcy Rule 7001 in particular, suggests
that the rules are limited to core (as opposed to non-core, ‘related to’) proceedings.”).
As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, “Rule 1001 was amended in 1987 for the specific
purpose of expanding the reach of the rules beyond the bankruptcy courts to all courts
hearing bankruptcy matters.” Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, 818 F.3d 1283,
1287 (11th Cir. 2016). As stated in the advisory committee notes, “amended
Bankruptcy Rule 1001 makes the Bankruptcy Rules applicable to cases and
proceedings under title 11, whether before the district judges or the bankruptcy judges
of the district.” Id. (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 advisory committee’s note to 1987
amendments) (emphasis added).
194
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (2018) (providing that the “district court shall
order that personal injury tort and wrongful death claims shall be tried in the district
court in which the bankruptcy case is pending, or in the district court in the district
in which the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy
case is pending”).

2019]

EXPRESS PRECLUSION OF THE FAA

669

matters,195 in either case the same Bankruptcy Code and same
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure apply to the matter. This
ensures that all parties affected by the bankruptcy are given notice
and provided the right to participate, even for matters pending
before the district court. The same procedures also apply whether
a matter “arises under” the Bankruptcy Code or is “non-core” but
related to a bankruptcy proceeding. As the Seventh Circuit has
explained, given “the new jurisdictional scheme” created through
the 1984 bankruptcy amendments in response to Marathon,
it would seem anomalous for different sets of procedural rules to
govern related proceedings in the same court, given the
bankruptcy scheme’s emphasis on centralization and efficiency.
The creation of a dual procedural system would not be consistent
with these goals, nor would it comport with Congress’s intent to
streamline the bankruptcy process.196

In contrast, state courts and non-judicial forums such as
arbitration may not provide the sort of rights given under the
Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules for notice and the right
of third parties affected by the bankruptcy proceedings to object.
This is especially true for some types of arbitration, which may bar
participation by non-parties and make the proceedings and even
awards confidential.197
One weakness of the current McMahon-based standard for
bankruptcy matters is that the centralization and efficiency
policies discussed by the courts of appeals are likely by themselves
insufficient justification for the courts of appeals’ rulings, as
the Supreme Court has held that judicial economy and avoidance
of “piecemeal litigation” is not enough to override the
FAA’s mandate. In reversing a court that had refused to order
arbitration of some issues on the basis of non-arbitrable matters
in the same proceeding, the Court stated, “We rigorously enforce
195

See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2018) (non-core but related proceedings in which the
parties have not consented to final order by the bankruptcy court).
196
Diamond Mortg. Corp. of Ill. v. Sugar, 913 F.2d 1233, 1243 (7th Cir. 1990).
197
See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1648 (2018) (“Arbitration
agreements often include provisions requiring that outcomes be kept confidential or
barring arbitrators from giving prior proceedings precedential effect.”) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Am. Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v. Hubbard, No. 18-11869,
2019 WL 115102, at *6 (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019) (enforcing arbitration agreement
requiring parties to arbitration to keep any rulings and decisions of the arbitrators
strictly confidential); Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240, 1249, 1252 (10th
Cir. 2018) (affirming arbitration award involving arbitration agreement requiring “all
arbitration proceedings, including but not limited to hearings, discovery, settlements,
and awards [to be kept] confidential”).
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agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is ‘piecemeal’ litigation,
at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another
federal statute.”198
Additionally, even if the purpose of the Arbitration Act is to
make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contractual
provisions, the 1978 Bankruptcy Code is grounded on the
modification of contractual rights.199 This both ensures that
honest but unfortunate debtors can receive a fresh start200 and
that creditors are not unfairly treated due to the machinations
between the debtor and particular creditors or other third
parties.201 Bankruptcy centralizes disputes affecting the estate
not only for efficiency’s sake, but to ensure the indirect rights of
other interested parties are taken into account and protected.
Bankruptcy is different from other litigation in this respect.
Especially because of the discharge, the bankruptcy proceeding
may be the last and only opportunity for creditors to share in the
distribution of the debtor’s assets, including proceeds of the
debtor’s claims against others. In individual creditor collection
actions outside of bankruptcy, the first to act or the one most likely
to gain the cooperation of the debtor may be able to obtain the
lion’s share of the debtor’s limited assets. In contrast, bankruptcy
law ensures a more equitable distribution by including all
creditors and parties with an interest in the estate in the
resolution of issues involving obligations owed by or owed to
the debtor.
In that process, the two parties to the arbitration
agreement—usually the debtor and a counterparty who may or
may not be a creditor of the estate—may not adequately represent
the interests of other affected parties. For example, an insolvent

198

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
See, e.g., Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain Mining Co.,
L.L.C.), 403 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining the “very purpose of bankruptcy
is to modify the rights of debtors and creditors”) (internal citation and quotation
omitted).
200
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2018) (discharge “operates as an injunction
against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process,
or an act, to collect, recover or offset any [discharged] debt as a personal liability of
the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.”); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5),
1222(b)(2), 1322(b)(2) (2018) (noting with certain exceptions, a bankruptcy plan of
reorganization may “modify the rights of holders of secured claims . . . or of holders of
unsecured claims”).
201
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548 (2018) (giving trustee power to avoid
preferential, fraudulent, and certain other types of prepetition transfers by the debtor
to third parties).
199
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debtor in a liquidating bankruptcy case may care very little about
objecting to claims against the estate, since the resolution affects
only the distribution between creditors as to assets the debtor is
not permitted to retain. Allowing the debtor and the counterparty
to arbitrate a dispute outside of the purview of the bankruptcy
court may therefore jeopardize creditors’ indirect interest in the
resolution of the issue. To address this concern, the Bankruptcy
Code gives creditors and other parties in interest the right to
notice of claims and the opportunity to object.202 Even before the
bankruptcy case commences, an insolvent debtor may have
diminished incentive to protect his or her nonexempt assets or may
be outright hostile to the interests of other creditors. The
Bankruptcy Code addresses this issue by appointing a trustee203 to
represent the general pool of creditors and by giving the trustee
the power to avoid certain prepetition transfers where the debtor,
and therefore the estate, did not receive reasonably equivalent
value, where the transfer was intended to defraud or hinder
creditors, or where the transfer constituted an unfair preference
in favor of a particular creditor.204 In order to ensure that the
trustee acts in the best interest of the estate, creditors are
generally entitled by the Bankruptcy Code and Rules to notice and
the opportunity to object to a trustee’s proposed use or sale of
estate property or to a settlement of a claim by or against the
estate.205 In contrast, arbitration proceedings between the two
counterparties to the arbitration agreement may not similarly
provide notice or the right to participate for nonparties who may
be affected by the resolution.
Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code expresses a certain
amount of paternalism, both because insolvent debtors may have
skewed or insufficient financial incentives, making them act in a
less than optimal fashion, and because one of the purposes of the
bankruptcy system is to prevent insolvent debtors from becoming
wards of the state.206 A bankruptcy debtor’s waiver of the right to
202

See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2018); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007.
Generally, in a Chapter 11 proceeding the debtor-in-possession performs this
role and is given the rights, powers, and duties of a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2018).
But see 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2018) (authorizing appointment of a trustee for cause or
certain circumstances on motion of a party in interest or the United States trustee).
204
11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548, 550 (2018).
205
11 U.S.C § 363 (2010); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2), 2002(a)(3), 6004, 9019(a).
206
In addition to the statutory prohibitions or invalidations of waiver, there is a
general equitable rule prohibiting a prepetition waiver of the protection of the
Bankruptcy Code as against public policy. See, e.g., Bank of China v. Huang (In re
203
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receive a discharge is valid only if made in writing, executed
post-petition, and approved by the bankruptcy court.207 If a debtor
does receive a discharge, any waiver of discharge of a specific debt
is ineffective.208 A debtor’s waiver of exemptions in favor of an
unsecured creditor is ineffective with respect to bankruptcy
exemptions.209 Nor does such a waiver deprive the debtor of the
bankruptcy right to avoid judicial and certain other liens
on exempt property.210 A waiver of the protections under the
Bankruptcy Code of a debtor against a debt relief agency is
unenforceable against the debtor “by any Federal or State court
or any other person.”211 Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code
invalidates any provision in a contract, lease, or applicable law
conditioned on the commencement of a bankruptcy case or the
insolvency or financial condition of the debtor which would
preclude property from entering the estate or restrict the estate’s
ability to use, sell, or lease property or assume or assign an
executory contract.212 Similarly, if a debtor agreed to terms of an
arbitration agreement that especially benefits a particular third
party—either because of preferential allegiance towards that
party or simply because on the verge of bankruptcy the debtor did
not care or had no choice—the bankruptcy jurisdictional
provisions ensure that the resolution of issues within the scope of
such agreement, but related to the bankruptcy, will not jeopardize
creditor interests.
Huang), 275 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It is against public policy for a debtor
to waive the prepetition protection of the Bankruptcy Code,” and “[t]his prohibition of
prepetition waiver has to be the law; otherwise, astute creditors would routinely
require their debtors to waive.”); Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1987) (stating in dictum that “[f]or public policy reasons, a debtor may not
contract away the right to a discharge in bankruptcy”); Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899,
904 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating in dictum that “an advance agreement to waive the benefits
of the [Bankruptcy] Act would be void”). But see Franchise Servs. of N. Am., Inc. v.
U.S. Trustee (In re Franchise Servs. of North America, Inc.), 891 F.3d 198, 207 (5th
Cir. 2018) (“assum[ing] without deciding that such a waiver is invalid”).
207
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10), 1141(d)(4), 1228(a), 1328(a) (2018).
208
11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2018). The only exception is a reaffirmation of a debt
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), requiring compliance with all provisions of that
section—including filing the reaffirmation agreement with the court, that required
disclosures were made and either approval by the bankruptcy court after a finding
that the reaffirmation of the debt will not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or
debtor’s dependents or a certification of debtor’s counsel to that effect. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 524(c), (d) (2018).
209
11 U.S.C. § 522(e) (2018).
210
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (2018).
211
11 U.S.C. § 526 (2018).
212
11 U.S.C. §§ 363(l), 365(b)(2) (2018); 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (2018).
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Moreover, the bankruptcy court’s and the United States
trustee’s ability to supervise bankruptcy cases and matters
affecting the estate—and in particular to enforce respect for the
automatic stay and the discharge—are essential to the integrity
and proper functioning of the bankruptcy system. The United
States trustee “may be heard on any issue” in a bankruptcy case
and “protect[s] the integrity of the bankruptcy system.”213 The
bankruptcy court may, on its own initiative, “sanction litigants for
filing documents with ‘any improper purpose’ as well as ‘tak[e] any
action . . . necessary or appropriate . . . to prevent an abuse of
process.’ ”214 This includes the power under § 707(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code to dismiss a bankruptcy case filed by a debtor in
bad faith—a “tool[] Congress has given bankruptcy courts to
protect their ‘jurisdictional integrity.’ ”215 Bankruptcy courts also
have both “civil contempt powers to impose compensatory
sanctions” and statutory authority to award actual and
punitive damages on creditors who knowingly violate the
automatic stay.216 Only the bankruptcy “court that issued the
discharge . . . ‘possesse[s] the power to enforce compliance with’
the discharge injunction.’”217
Thus, contrary to the suggestion of the Second Circuit in
MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Hill, an alleged violation of the
automatic stay does implicate the fundamental purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code even if a bankruptcy case had already closed and
the debtor received a discharge by the time the action was brought
before the bankruptcy court.218 Regardless of whether the
violation was a past or ongoing violation, the “automatic stay
213
Harrington v. Simmons (In re Simmons), 810 F.3d 852, 855 (1st Cir. 2016) (first
citing 11 U.S.C. § 307 (2012); and then citing In re Youk-See, 450 B.R. 312, 323
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2011)); see also Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors,
780 F.3d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating the “goal of the Trustee is to ‘promote
the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the benefit of all
stakeholders—debtors, creditors, and the public.’ ” (quoting 1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM POLICY AND PRACTICES MANUAL
§ 1-4.2.1 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/volume_1_overview.pdf/download)).
214
Piazza v. Nueterra Healthcare Physical Therapy, LLC (In re Piazza), 719 F.3d
1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(b)(1); then quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012)).
215
Id. at 1262.
216
America’s Servicing Co. v. Schwartz-Tallard (In re Schwartz-Tallard), 803 F.3d
1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) (2012)).
217
Jones v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 666 F. App’x 766, 774 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Green Point Credit, LLC v. McLean (In re McLean), 794 F.3d 1313, 1318–19 (11th
Cir. 2015)).
218
436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006).
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provision of the Bankruptcy Code” is “one of the fundamental
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.”219 It is
systemically important that creditors respect the automatic stay,
both to protect debtors from pressure and harassment and to
protect bankruptcy estates from dissipation. The “exercise of
jurisdiction over the bankruptcy estate and the equitable
distribution of the estate’s property among the debtor’s creditors
are two of the three core in rem functions of a bankruptcy court.”220
The automatic stay “allows the court to carry out both of these
functions [by facilitating] the orderly administration and
distribution of the estate” and “protect[ing] the bankrupt’s estate
from being eaten away by creditors’ lawsuits and seizures of
property before the trustee has had a chance to marshal the
estate’s assets and distribute them equitably among the
creditors.”221 If routinely left unenforced, the bankruptcy stay
loses its deterrence power.222 So important is the need to enforce
the automatic stay that, by expressly creating a cause of action for
debtors to seek damages for a willful violation of the stay,
“Congress sought to encourage injured debtors to bring suit to
vindicate their statutory right to the automatic stay’s protection,
one of the most important rights afforded to debtors by the

219
Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 503 (1986)
(citing S. REP. NO. 95–989, 54; H.R. REP. NO. 95–595, 340).
220
Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Diaz (In re Diaz), 647 F.3d 1073, 1085 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citing Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2006)).
221
Id. (quoting Martin-Trigona v. Champion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 892 F.2d
575, 577 (7th Cir. 1989)).
222
As explained by the court in In re Bateman:
More importantly, a court has a significant interest in enforcing any
injunction it issues, and this court has not agreed to arbitrate its contempt
powers. As discussed in more detail below, the court has a substantial
interest in enforcing its own orders and protecting the integrity of the
discharge injunction. Contempt powers are vital and significant to any
judicial process, but are particularly crucial when enforcing injunctions. And
they may include, in the proper case, those traditional sanctions for coercing
compliance with an injunction such as incarceration or financial penalty.
585 B.R. 618, 628 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2018); see also, e.g., In re Jorge, 568 B.R. 25, 36
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2017) (“The parties, whether through a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement or any other agreement, cannot strip a court of its inherent power and
certainly not the inherent power to enforce its own orders. Violations of the discharge
injunction are inherently non-arbitrable because the discharge injunction vindicates
a federal right that this Court previously awarded the Debtors—i.e., the bankruptcy
discharge.”).
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Bankruptcy Code.”223 But such purpose “can be carried out, of
course, only if injured debtors are actually able to sue to recover
the damages that § 362(k) authorizes.”224
It is also important not to confuse a debtor with a debtor’s
estate, particularly in reorganization cases where the debtor
maintains possession of property of the estate and in some respects
acts as a fiduciary on behalf of creditors. The Third Circuit in
Mintze v. American General Financial Services, Inc. (In re Mintze)
may not have fully considered this in finding that fundamental
bankruptcy purposes could not be impaired by mandatory
arbitration of a Chapter 13 debtor’s adversary proceeding against
a mortgage creditor who had filed a proof of claim in the case.225
Seeking to enforce a prepetition rescission of the mortgage under
the Truth in Lending Act, the debtor alleged that the lender had
“induced her to enter into an illegal and abusive home equity
loan,” and asserted several other claims under federal and state
consumer protection laws. The court emphasized that it was the
debtor who brought the action and “failed to raise any statutory
claims that were created by the Bankruptcy Code.”226 But the
debtor was attacking the validity of a debt and security interest,
for which the creditor had filed a proof of claim, and therefore
likely constituted an objection to claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(b).227 An objection pursuant to § 502(b) is, of course,
a statutory claim created by the Bankruptcy Code, and a
fundamental part of the bankruptcy system.228 Second, to the
extent the proceeding sought to collect a claim for the benefit of
the estate, the debtor was likely acting for the benefit of the estate
and possibly exercising the powers of a trustee.229 The Third
223

Am.’s Servicing Co. v. Schwartz-Tallard (In re Schwartz-Tallard), 803 F.3d
1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2015).
224
Id.
225
434 F.3d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 2006).
226
Id. at 226, 231.
227
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3007(b) (“A party in interest shall not include a demand
for relief of a kind specified in Rule 7001 in an objection to the allowance of a claim,
but may include the objection in an adversary proceeding.”).
228
See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 58 (1989) (suggesting
that allowance and disallowance of claims against the estate are “integral to the
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations” in bankruptcy).
229
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1303 (2018) (detailing the rights and powers of a Chapter
13 debtor); Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[A]
Chapter 13 debtor retains standing to continue to pursue [a] civil claim”); Smith v.
SIPI, LLC (In re Smith), 811 F.3d 228, 241 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Chapter 13 grants debtors
possession of the estate’s property, which includes legal interests and the right to
bring legal claims that could be prosecuted for benefit of the estate.”) (citation
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Circuit noted that the bankruptcy court had specifically found that
“the outcome of Mintze’s rescission claim would affect her
bankruptcy plan and the distribution of monies to her other
creditors.”230 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals disagreed with
such finding, in part due to an overemphasis on the importance
that the debtor was an individual. But regardless of whether the
underlying rights arose under state or non-bankruptcy law and
whether brought by a trustee or a Chapter 13 debtor, the
adjudication would still have a material impact on creditors, who
would have shared in the distribution of any funds obtained or
may have received a larger share of distributions if American
General Financial Services’s claim was disallowed.
These holdings demonstrate the danger of the narrow
bankruptcy exception the courts of appeals have drawn with
respect to the FAA. More is at stake than simple efficiency. It is
especially important to remember the distinction between the
debtor and the debtor’s estate and remember the twin goals of
bankruptcy: both to give a debtor a fresh start and to ensure an
equitable distribution to the debtor’s creditors. Thus, while it
might seem perfectly fair to hold a debtor to his or her voluntary
agreement to arbitrate disputes outside of bankruptcy,231 in
bankruptcy those restrictions may have a greater impact on
creditors who never consented to the agreement. Congress wisely
provided a forum for those parties to participate, and they should
not be deprived of that forum merely because of the prepetition
agreement of the debtor.
IV. THE PLACE OF ARBITRATION WITHIN BANKRUPTCY
This is not to say that the Bankruptcy Code or the policies
behind it prohibit arbitration. 28 U.S.C. § 654, enacted in 1988,232
expressly provides that “[n]otwithstanding any provision of law to

omitted); Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A] Chapter
13 debtor possesses standing—concurrent with that of the trustee—to maintain a
non-bankruptcy cause of action on behalf of the estate.”).
230
In re Mintze, 434 F.3d at 227 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin.,
Inc. (In re Mintze), 288 B.R. 95, 99–100 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2003)).
231
Though, of course, the discharge in bankruptcy reflects that at least with
respect to financial obligations there comes a point where it is fairer to release debtors
from their obligations—no matter how voluntary they originally were. One cannot
draw blood from a stone, and at some point continuing to hold those who cannot pay
accountable for debts becomes a cost for society.
232
The provision was added by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4659-61 (1988).
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the contrary,” with certain exceptions district courts “may allow
the referral to arbitration of any civil action (including any
adversary proceeding in bankruptcy) pending before it when the
parties consent . . . .”233 This provision was enacted subsequent to
the 1984 bankruptcy amendments and expressly applies to
bankruptcy proceedings. But the provision does not require a
court to refer matters to arbitration, and by its terms only applies
“when the parties consent.”234 The Bankruptcy Rules similarly
provide that “[o]n stipulation of the parties to any controversy
affecting the estate the court may authorize the matter to be
submitted to final and binding arbitration.”235 Like § 654, Rule
9019 requires agreement of the parties to the controversy and is
in the discretion of the bankruptcy court.
Importantly, unlike mandatory arbitration under the FAA,
these provisions give both the direct parties to the dispute and
parties indirectly affected by the dispute because of its relation to
the bankruptcy case—such as creditors, the United States trustee,
and any case trustee—notice and the opportunity to object before
arbitration is ordered. In many situations creditors might decide
not to object. The issue in dispute may be so marginal or a
creditor’s claim may be so proportionally small in comparison to
the size of the bankruptcy estate and other creditors’ claims that
the creditor would not find it worthwhile to spend the time or
expenses of monitoring or participating even if the issue were
litigated in the bankruptcy court. Or a small creditor may choose
to rely on the bankruptcy trustee to represent its interests and
might be satisfied so long as the trustee is able to monitor or
participate in the arbitration proceeding. Indeed, to the extent
arbitration is quicker or more cost efficient, a creditor may even
prefer to allow the matter to go to arbitration.236 On the other
hand, a large creditor with a relatively large stake in the
233

28 U.S.C. § 654 (2018).
Id.
235
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(c) (1993).
236
To the extent that a bankruptcy trustee seeks to enforce an arbitration clause
against a third party with respect to a non-bankruptcy claim of the estate against such
party, the trustee may be able to do so. The Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee and
the estate “the benefit of any defense available to the debtor as against any entity
other than the estate, including statutes of limitation, statutes of frauds, usury, and
other personal defenses,” and a “waiver of any such defense by the debtor after the
commencement of the case does not bind the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 558 (2018). But
Bankruptcy Rule 9019 would still require notice and court approval with the
opportunity for creditors and other parties with an interest in the bankruptcy
proceeding to object. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019 (1993).
234
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bankruptcy estate or a creditor who distrusts or disagrees with the
approach of a trustee237 or debtor-in-possession may not want an
issue that could impact the estate to go to an arbitration
proceeding. The bankruptcy system gives such a creditor the right
to object to arbitration that would take a matter from the
federal court.
At least one commentator has noted that the abstention238
framework already found within 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) may work
well as a standard for bankruptcy courts’ decision whether or not
to allow or order arbitration of matters within their jurisdiction.239
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) provides that “nothing in this section
prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest
of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from
abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under

237

For example, a creditor may be more willing to invest in upfront litigation costs
than a trustee where there are few liquid assets in the estate to fund such litigation.
238
Similarly, to the extent the automatic stay would prevent litigation of certain
matters against the debtor or estate, a party may be able to obtain relief from the
automatic stay in certain circumstances. “Cause” may exist to grant relief from the
automatic stay to permit a claim against the debtor to proceed in another forum.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2018). Courts have used various factors in determining whether
“cause” exists, such as:
(1) whether relief would result in a partial or complete resolution of the
issues; (2) lack of any connection with or interference with the bankruptcy
case; (3) whether the other proceeding involves the debtor as a fiduciary;
(4) whether a specialized tribunal with the necessary expertise has been
established to hear the cause of action; (5) whether the debtor’s insurer has
assumed full responsibility for defending it; (6) whether the action primarily
involves third parties; (7) whether litigation in another forum would
prejudice the interests of other creditors; (8) whether the judgment claim
arising from the other action is subject to equitable subordination;
(9) whether movant’s success in the other proceeding would result in a
judicial lien avoidable by the debtor; (10) the interests of judicial economy
and the expeditious and economical resolution of litigation; (11) whether the
parties are ready for trial in the other proceeding; and (12) impact of the stay
on the parties and the balance of harms.
Mazzeo v. Lenhart (In re Mazzeo), 167 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Sonnax
Indus., Inc. v. Tri Component Prods. Corp. (In re Sonnax Indus., Inc.), 907 F.2d 1280,
1286 (2d Cir. 1990)).
239
Birney, supra note 23, at 670 (“[T]he bankruptcy courts’ decision to decide to
enforce an arbitration agreement, or rather, to require the parties to adjudicate the
dispute in the bankruptcy court, should be exclusively analyzed through the
framework contained in section 1334(c)(1), and not by treating the FAA as preempting
bankruptcy jurisdiction.”); see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 502 (2011) (noting
Section 1334(c) as an example that “the framework Congress adopted in the 1984 Act
already contemplates that certain state law matters in bankruptcy cases will be
resolved by judges other than those of the bankruptcy courts”).
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title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.”240 Section
1334(c)(2), sometimes referred to as the “mandatory abstention”
provision, requires a federal court to abstain
[u]pon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a
State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case
under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case
under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have
been commenced in a court of the United States absent
jurisdiction under this section . . . if an action is commenced, and
can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate
jurisdiction.241

There is a question of whether mandatory abstention under
§ 1334(c)(2) could ever apply to arbitration—namely, whether an
arbitration proceeding constitutes “a State forum of appropriate
jurisdiction” as used in the statute.242 Even if it did apply, the
statute suggests that it would only apply where such proceeding
was commenced prepetition and involved only state law claims. In
contrast, permissive abstention refers more generally to “the
interest of justice”243 in addition to comity for state courts as
warranting abstention and therefore is likely broad enough to
capture abstention in favor of arbitration.
In determining whether permissive abstention is appropriate,
courts have “looked to factors such as the extent to which state law
issues predominate over bankruptcy issues, the presence of a
related proceeding commenced in state court, and the likelihood
that the commencement of the proceeding in bankruptcy court
involves forum shopping by one of the litigants.”244 Other courts
have set forth a longer list of factors to consider, including:
240

28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (2018).
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (2018); see also, e.g., Lindsey v. Dow Chem. Co. (In re
Dow Corning Corp.), 113 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[F]or mandatory abstention
to apply to a particular proceeding, there must be a timely motion by a party to that
proceeding, and the proceeding must: (1) be based on a state law claim or cause of
action; (2) lack a federal jurisdictional basis absent the bankruptcy; (3) be commenced
in a state forum of appropriate jurisdiction; (4) be capable of timely adjudication; and
(5) be a non-core proceeding.”).
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Ironically, the Supreme Court’s holdings that the FAA requires arbitration as
a matter of federal substantive law, even where state law would override an
arbitration agreement, tends to further undercut the argument that arbitration could
be seen as a “State forum of . . . jurisdiction.” Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006) (“[T]he FAA ‘create[d] a body of federal
substantive law,’ which was ‘applicable in state and federal courts.’ ” (quoting
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984))).
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See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (2018).
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Canzano v. Ragosa (In re Colarusso), 382 F.3d 51, 57 (1st Cir. 2004).
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(1) the effect or lack thereof on the efficient administration of the
estate if a Court recommends abstention, (2) the extent to which
state law issues predominate over bankruptcy issues, (3) the
difficulty or unsettled nature of the applicable law, (4) the
presence of a related proceeding commenced in state court or
other nonbankruptcy court, (5) the jurisdictional basis, if any,
other than 28 U.S.C. § 1334, (6) the degree of relatedness or
remoteness of the proceeding to the main bankruptcy case, (7) the
substance rather than form of an asserted “core” proceeding,
(8) the feasibility of severing state law claims from core
bankruptcy matters to allow judgments to be entered in state
court with enforcement left to the bankruptcy court, (9) the
burden of [the bankruptcy court’s] docket, (10) the likelihood that
the commencement of the proceeding in bankruptcy court
involves forum shopping by one of the parties, (11) the existence
of a right to a jury trial, and (12) the presence in the proceeding
of nondebtor parties.245

Thus, the distinction between “core” and “non-core” matters
drawn by courts such as Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. or the distinction between matters that
involve “statutory claims that were created by the Bankruptcy
Code” and that do not, as drawn by the court in In re Mintze, could
ultimately be relevant to the determination of whether a
bankruptcy court should order arbitration of a bankruptcy-related
matter.246 But there is no bright-line rule based on such
distinctions. Instead, other factors such as (1) whether arbitration
could jeopardize the efficient administration of the estate, (2) the
degree of relatedness to the bankruptcy case, (3) the feasibility of
severing the matter to be arbitrated from the bankruptcy case,
(4) the likelihood that the request to arbitrate is based on forum
shopping, (5) the presence and rights of nondebtor parties and
(6) such parties’ ability or lack of ability to participate in the
arbitration, may all warrant refusal to force arbitration of
even non-core or state law bankruptcy-related matters. Moreover,
unlike under the current approach, it should be the party
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Christensen v. Tucson Est., Inc. (In re Tucson Est., Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1167
(9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Republic Reader’s Serv., Inc. v. Mag. Serv. Bureau, Inc. (In re
Republic Reader’s Serv., Inc.), 81 B.R. 422, 429 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987)); see also, e.g.,
In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 6 F.3d 1184, 1189 (7th Cir. 1993)
(quoting the Tuscon Est. factors).
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In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 2006).
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seeking arbitration who bears the burden of demonstrating that
arbitration is appropriate and will not impair the rights of any
party with an interest in the bankruptcy proceeding.
CONCLUSION
In Epic Systems, the Supreme Court explained that Congress
enacted the FAA in 1925 because “in Congress’s judgment
arbitration had more to offer than courts recognized—not least the
promise of quicker, more informal, and often cheaper resolutions
for everyone involved.”247 But in 1978, Congress made a similar
judgment about the bankruptcy system, recognizing that granting
broad jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts over all matters relating
to bankruptcy cases promised not only quicker and cheaper
resolution but greater due process to all affected by the bankruptcy
and the prevention of unfair bargaining leverage against trustees
by parties who owed the estate money.248 So broad was the grant
of jurisdiction that the Supreme Court subsequently found
it unconstitutional, at least to the extent it authorized
non-Article III bankruptcy judges to issue final rulings on certain
issues. Congress amended the statute in 1984, but again
deliberately chose not to diminish the broad grant of jurisdiction
to the federal courts, instead addressing the constitutional issue
by slightly reallocating the grant of authority as between the
bankruptcy courts and the district courts of which they were recast
as a unit. In both cases, Congress stated its clear intent that the
grant of original jurisdiction takes supremacy over any contrary
federal statute that might otherwise divest the federal courts of
their original jurisdiction over such matters.
The language is so clear it seems surprising that courts have
not yet adopted the approach. The Third Circuit’s movement from
Zimmerman to Hays seems to explain that the courts may have
overestimated the import of the 1984 amendments or drawn
conclusions about what they saw as a trend in the Supreme Court’s
rulings on the FAA. Once Hays was decided, other courts seem to
have followed its path rather than look for the language that was
clearly present in the statute. But it is that approach ungrounded
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138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018).
See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
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in statutory text that is “far out of step with [the Supreme Court’s]
current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring
[arbitration.]”249
This Article’s proposed approach is based on text, not mere
policy, and is consistent with Supreme Court precedent on
preclusion and repeal, both generally and in the context of the
FAA. The approach is based on unique features of bankruptcy,
recognizing Congress’s intent to create procedures for the
adjudication of bankruptcy cases, and not a general attack on
agreements to arbitrate. It does not invalidate arbitration
agreements, but simply recognizes that an agreement between two
signatories prior to a bankruptcy proceeding cannot take away the
procedural protections Congress has given creditors and other
parties to a bankruptcy case over matters affecting the bankruptcy
estate—parties who were not signatories to the agreement. The
approach also still leaves open the possibility of arbitration of even
core bankruptcy matters, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 654 and
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019(c), but consistent with
those provisions does not make arbitration mandatory, requires
consent and bankruptcy court approval, and thus protects the
interests and due process of creditors and the integrity of the
bankruptcy system.

249
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (quoting
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).

